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THE EFFECT OF RISK ON LEGAL VALUATION
ROBERT J. RHEE*
From a financial economic perspective, the governing condition of a
meritorious civil action is the uncertainty of outcome. Expectation
and outcome deviate, and the spread is the measure of uncertainty (or
variance). During litigation each party has an option to settle or se-
lect trial. The decision standard can be seen as an option strike price
and a finding of liability as an "in-the-money" call option. This ap-
parent optionality suggests the application of an option pricing model
to legal valuation, and a small but growing body of scholarship en-
dorses this concept. However, option theory is not the only concept.
Under an asset pricing model, the value of an asset is the sum of its
expected cashflow discounted by its risk, Uncertainty is the key vari-
able in the values of an option and an asset, but risk has a bipolar ef-
fect on value. Greater risk increases option value, but decreases as-
set value. At issue is the essential nature of a disputed right: is a
lawsuit conceptually an option or an asset? This article argues that
the essential nature of a lawsuit is best viewed as an asset. Uncer-
tainty diminishes lawsuit value consistent with the prediction of asset
pricing principles. This article shows that expected value, which has
been a durable concept in law and economic literature, does not
equal true economic value. The assumption of risk neutrality as-
sumes away the most difficult aspect of the valuational analysis and
fails to account for a risk-adjusted discount reflecting the quality of
the forecast. Thus, two cases with the same expected value are not
valuational equivalents if the variance of returns is perceived differ-
ently, and this article analyzes how parties account for different per-
ceptions of risk in valuation.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, law and economics scholarship has subscribed to
the conventional wisdom that the value of a legal dispute is its expected
value, defined as the probability of liability multiplied by the expected
judgment amount. 1 The cost-benefit analysis provides a simple method
of analyzing value in the absence of market pricing.2 The model as-
sumes that expected value discounts the inherent uncertainty of litigation
by its probability. This theory supports the prescription that if parties
can agree on expected value, settlement is superior to litigation since
economic surplus can be extracted from foregone litigation cost. This
prescription derives from Ronald Coase's work on transaction cost eco-
nomics. 3 It has been argued that transaction cost constitutes a source of
economic inefficiency, prompting a legion of scholarship to condemn
litigation as a wasteful activity. 4 Thus, the key variables in pricing a dis-
1. See, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279
(1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22
STAN. L. REv. 67 (1969).
2. The central problem is that settlement values cannot be checked against an independ-
ent market valuation. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 254-55 (1984) (noting that "real-world" legal problems cen-
ter on achieving "correctly priced" assets in the absence of efficient market pricing). This
problem has long since been recognized. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786, 792 (1911)
(discussing the problem of when there is "no market for the particular class of goods" in as-
sessing damages).
3. Landes credits Coase for laying the doctrinal foundation for an economic approach to
negotiation. Landes, supra note 1, at 102 n.61 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
4. The list is too long for a comprehensive citation. See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy, The
Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1992); Robert D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27
J. EcON. LITERATURE 1067, 1074 (1989) (trials are "mistakes"); Margaret Meriwether
Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996) ("Set-
tlement is favored in the law for a variety of reasons."); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1996)
(footnote omitted) ("Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but serious enough to be avoided at
any reasonable cost."); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litiga-
tion Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 107-08 (1994) (suggesting
that most scholars consider trials "mistakes" that leave "society worse off"); David M. Trubek
et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 122 (1983) (stating that settle-
ment is "perhaps the most cost-effective activity"). Only a minority of scholars view litigation
and trial as a socially productive activity or compatible with notions of economic efficiency.
See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 627 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Ex-
plosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982 (2003); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bar-
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pute have been identified as transaction cost and expected value.
Around the same time that Coase published The Problem of Social
Cost, financial economics was rapidly developing with the Nobel Prize-
winning works of Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe, Robert Merton,
Fischer Black, and Myron Scholes.5 Their works produced Portfolio
Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Black-Scholes-Merton
option pricing models. In the course of the past fifty years, these ideas
revolutionized the modem derivatives and capital markets. 6 Financial
economics is the branch of economics that deals with valuation. It fun-
damentally involves "the valuation of cash flows that extend over time
and are usually uncertain," 7 an apt description of the economics of a le-
gal dispute. Finance theory offers a fresh way to analyze lawsuit value,
and this analysis is richer than the linear reductions of the expected value
model. Also, unlike some other branches of economics perhaps, finan-
cial economics enjoys a tangible "symbiosis" between theory and em-
pirical observation of market practices.8 Yet, there is a "remarkable gap"
between scholarship in financial economics and legal bargaining. 9 Only
recently have scholars begun to bridge this gap. 10 By analogizing law-
suits to investments, scholars view legal valuation not from the perspec-
tive of standard cost-benefit analysis, which ideally requires information
completeness, 1 ' but from the perspective of risk management, which as-
sumes that uncertainty is the governing condition. This is a critical shift
gaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation under Uncertainty, 56
EMORY L.J. 617 (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author); Owen M. Fiss, Com-
ment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Cf Mark Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell:
Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1998); Marc
Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55 (1988).
5. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabili-
ties, 81 J. POL. EcON. 637 (1973); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952);
Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141
(1973); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Con-
ditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
6. See Christopher Farrell, Three Wise Men of Finance, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at
20 (noting the pioneering works of Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe and Merton Miller as
having profound impacts on modem finance). See generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL
IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET (1992);
7. STEPHEN A. Ross, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 1 (2005).
8. Sam Peltzman, The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article, 99 J.
POL. ECON. 201, 211 (1991).
9. Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1270-71 (2006).
10. See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990) (first application of option analysis to legal bargaining); Grundfest &
Huang, supra note 9; Rhee, supra note 4.
11. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 40-41, on file with author) (arguing that stan-
dard cost-benefit analysis depends on completeness of information) (citing AMARTYA SEN,
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 563-65 (2002)).
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in analytic framework.
Despite the promise of an interdisciplinary analysis, the debate is
unsettled as to the valuational method. The risk of a lawsuit is the vari-
ance of the outcome, and this uncertainty must affect value. 12 But risk
impacts valuation differently. At the crossroad of this debate are two
broad concepts: option pricing and asset pricing models. If these con-
cepts are complementary, the debate would be merely academic. But the
effect of risk in valuation has a Jekyll-Hyde duality. Greater riskiness of
the underlying asset increases option value, whereas greater riskiness of
expected cashflow discounts asset value. Because the essential nature of
a legal dispute resembles both an option and an asset, harmonizing this
dichotomy is imperative in establishing a conceptual framework of legal
valuation. Because risk affects value differently in the context of that
which is valued, harmonization requires a clear understanding of the ob-
jects of valuation.
The tug and pull of uncertainty on valuation underscores the impor-
tance of the issue. Scholarship is split on the proper application of finan-
cial economics, but, thus far, no scholar has analyzed this dichotomy. 13
This article reconciles the tension between the apparent option and asset
qualities of a lawsuit, and provides a valuation framework under finance
theory. It advances two essential propositions.
First, a lawsuit is fundamentally an asset and should be valued un-
der asset pricing principles. This is not to suggest that option pricing
theory is irrelevant. Embedded in a lawsuit is a real option to go to trial,
which derives its value from the underlying disputed right. 14 This option
has greater value with increased uncertainty. It is important, however, to
distinguish this procedural right from the underlying substantive right,
which must be priced as an asset.
Second, expected value is simply a probabilistic forecast of the fu-
ture return and does not adjust the return on the basis of its risk. In other
words, it states the quantity of a future cashflow, but bears no relation to
its quality. A proper valuation should discount expected value by its
risk, which is the measure of variance from expectation. This discount-
ing, a commonly seen empirical observation in the financial market, is a
way in which parties account for risk, and this article establishes a rela-
12. The terms risk and uncertainty are used synonymously. See infra note 28.
13. Most scholars have proposed option analytics. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New
Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996);
Cornell, supra note 10; Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9; see also Paul G. Mahoney, Contract
Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995). In a recent article, I applied
principles of asset pricing to construct a price theory of legal bargaining. Rhee, supra note 4.
14. A real option is an option embedded in an asset. See infra note 69 and accompanying
text.
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tionship between the size of the discount and the value of the real option.
I. ASSUMPTIONS, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Since economic analysis depends on simplifying assumptions, they
must be clearly stated. 15 A rational investor in an economic venture
seeks to maximize profit and minimize loss and risk.16 An assumption
of risk neutrality is inconsistent with the behavior of financial markets,
which rewards risk bearers with return. 17 Most people are not indifferent
to risk, or undertake risk gratuitously. If the anticipated returns are the
same, they prefer the certain return over the probabilistically equivalent
one. The market convention is that one should undertake risk only if
there is a commensurate prospect of increased return. These assumptions
are based on Harry Markowitz's Portfolio Theory, which prescribes that
a rational investor should seek to maximize return at the lowest possible
risk and that risk should be undertaken only with the compensation of
enhanced return. 18
This article does not explore issues relating to game theory or psy-
chology. 19 To this end, I assume equitable bargaining. The factors of
valuation are transparent as between the parties. Each party has knowl-
edge of the other's view of probability, variance, and payouts-factors
that all parties strive to learn in the course of bargaining and litigation.
This assumption eliminates much of the game theory aspect of bargain-
ing and the transactional friction from information asymmetry. Impor-
15. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 2-6 (3d
ed. 2003) (noting the limitations placed on economic theory by the necessary use of assump-
tions).
16. See Cornell, supra note 10, at 173 (considering lawsuit as an "investment"); Grund-
fest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1269-70, 1269 n.1 ("Lawsuits and investment projects have
much in common."); Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9, on file with author) ("The perspec-
tive is that of a financier or investor in an economic project."); see also Robert J. Rhee, The
Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA.
ENVT'L L.J. 111, 156-57 (2004) [hereinafter Rhee, Application of Finance Theory] (analogiz-
ing lawsuit to a financial project in which "plaintiff provides the business opportunity, and the
attorney provides not only the intellectual capital and labor but often the financial capital in the
form of contingent attorney's fees and costs").
17. See SERGIO M. FOCARDI & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL
MODELING AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 484 (2004) ("A reasonable assumption is that
investors are risk averse.").
18. Markowitz, supra note 5.
19. These issues are important in the larger scope of bargaining theory. The scholarship
in these areas is rich, and a comprehensive citation would be too voluminous. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-29 (1982) (noting the problem of strate-
gic bargaining); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 4 (discussing psychological barriers). See
generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
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tantly, the parties are assumed to engage in relative valuation. The fac-
tors of value cannot be limited to one's own view of the case, but each
party, in theory and in practice, seeks the other's view of the case as a
factor of valuation. The parties then make adjustments to value based on
the knowledge learned. Just like other exercises in valuation, the assump-
tion is that settlement value is always subject to a market check, even if
that "market" constitutes the parties only.
This article applies primarily to meritorious, contested cases that are
not subject to pretrial disposition. 20 Pretrial dispositions eliminate most
cases where the possibility of success is remote.2 1 The possibility of
dismissal raises the risk of a case, and so the concepts here apply com-
fortably to such cases. Nevertheless, it is simpler to evaluate settlement
value against the expected trial outcome without considering the contin-
gency of sudden dismissals for remoteness of success.
This article does not explore the issue of agency cost. This issue is
complex, and its exploration in conjunction with an analysis of the gen-
eral framework of economic valuation would cloud the latter. Agency
cost is assumed to be zero, meaning that there is no divergence of inter-
ests between attorney and client or that the dispute is resolved without
attorneys. This is an unrealistic assumption since we expect that the
agency nature of attorney representation would impose cost on the client
in some cases at least, 22 but the issue is better left for another day. That
said, this article explores some ways in which attorneys play a critical
role within the asset pricing scheme of dispute resolution.23
The above assumptions create a set of conditions under which the
problem of comparative valuation between settlement and trial is iso-
lated. Additionally, clear definitions of several concepts are important.
First, transaction cost is defined narrowly as the direct economic cost of
20. See Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 89 (22.5% of cases are dismissed or decided on the
merits before trial).
21. Pretrial dispositive motions result in the dismissal of cases that have remote possibil-
ity of success because the claims either are unsupported by sufficient facts or lack legal sup-
port. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6), 50(a), 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252 (1986) (stating that "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat
summary judgment or directed verdict); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1986) (summary judgment is allowed when the supporting evidence is
"speculative"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[the] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim .. "); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395
(1943) (holding, in a directed verdict, that "the essential requirement is that mere speculation
be not allowed").
22. See Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503
(1996).
23. See infra Section VIE.
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attorneys and other expenses related to resolving a dispute such as the
cost of time and energy-all costs that are typically associated with the
expense of litigation and reducible to a cash equivalent. 24 The cost of
resolution means the total economic cost of resolving a dispute through
litigation or settlement. Transaction cost is only a component of the cost
of resolution. Its other major part is not reducible to a cash or cash
equivalent expense. Like a firm's cost of capital, it may be imbedded in
the valuation of the dispute through a discount to value.25 Thus, it may
not be readily apparent but is equally consequential. 26
Second, variance is defined in financial economics as the statistical
mean squared deviation from the expected value, which is the risk of an
expected return. 27 With zero variance, there is no risk as the expected
result is certain. Risk and uncertainty are used synonymously. 28 In the
legal context, meaningful statistical or quantitative measurements are un-
available or inapplicable. Thus, variance is defined as the measure of
one's belief about the possible deviations of a judgment from expecta-
tion, and it gauges the subjective perception of uncertainty. Risk is per-
ceived ex ante. It is pointless to analyze a matter from an ex post per-
spective when the task at hand is to manage risk whose definition is
uncertainty of outcome.29
Third, the concept of probability pervades law and economics litera-
ture.30 It is often assumed as a relative frequency, a number between
24. Because the perspective is that of a rational investor (and not that of good citizen,
judge or legislator), the concept of transaction cost is not considered in the context of a norma-
tive scheme to allocate social cost or externalities. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Coase, supra note 3.
25. See infra Section III.A (discussing the implication of cost of capital as calculated by
the Capital Asset Pricing Model on valuation).
26. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
27. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 1005 (8th ed. 2006). Variance and volatility are synonymous in finan-
cial economics. Id. at 556.
28. The economic literature sometimes distinguishes risk and uncertainty in that risk
"consists of future states in which the outcomes, though unknown, follow a known distribu-
tion, while uncertainty consists of those future states for which the distributions are also un-
known." Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default
Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 365 n.141 (1998) (citing FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233-34 (1921)). Because distributions in legal
analysis are elusive and not particularly helpful in shedding light on any specific case, I do not
make this distinction and use the two terms interchangeably.
29. "Once the outcomes are observed, it usually is easy to say what would have been the
best decision. However, we cannot evaluate decisions from this perspective, which is why
probability distributions are so important." SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS,
RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 37 (1999).
30. Perhaps the most famous application of probability is the Hand formula. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972) (commenting that the Hand formula
2007]
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zero and one.3 1 Relative frequency has little application in legal assess-
ment in either theory or practice. 32 Probability is "the degree of belief
which it is rational to place in a hypothesis or proposition on given evi-
dence." 33 Legal assessment is a subjective endeavor, and thus "it is not
always possible to say that the degree of our rational belief in one con-
clusion is either equal to, greater than, or less than the degree of our be-
lief in another." 34 It is fundamentally a "judgment of credibility," 35 in-
volving a range of plausible reasoning and producing multivariate
outcomes that are neither probabilistically predictable nor objectively as-
sessable. Probability is subjective and lacks a quantitative foundation to
support a cost-benefit analysis that would purport to derive a "clear op-
timal outcome." 36 But given that most law and economics literature dis-
cusses probability as a relative frequency, the familiar language is used
only to facilitate communication of the subjective degrees of rational be-
liefs and to avoid a repetition of arguments made in the past.3 7
Lastly, the standard model refers to the generally accepted cost-
benefit analysis of legal bargaining. The theory is simple. The plaintiffs
minimum settlement value is the expected value, being the expected
judgment multiplied by the probability of liability, minus litigation
costs. 3 8 The same analysis applies for the defendant, except that transac-
provides an applicable test for the determination of negligence); Richard W. Wright, Hand,
Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula, " 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145 (2003)
(criticizing the Hand Formula and its perceived importance in the field of tort law).
31. See, e.g., Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1286 (treating probability as a relative
frequency); Jeffrey O'Connell, Jeremy Kidd & Evan Stephenson, An Economic Model Costing
"Early Offers" Medical Malpractice Reform: Trading Noneconomic Damages for Prompt
Payment of Economic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 259 (2005) (same); Posner, supra note 1
(same); Priest & Klein, supra note 1 (same). Even when scholars recognize the subjective na-
ture of probability, its implications are not explored. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 55 (1987) (noting that the
utility function depends on "subjective probability" but failing to discuss the implications on
tort theory). As Robert Cooter explains, there is an assumption of rational expectation where
"expectations contain no systematic bias, that is, the subjective expectations correspond to the
objective frequencies of the random event." Cooter, supra note 19, at 22.
32. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17-24, on file with author) (discussing the dif-
ference between statistical probability and inductive probability). For a vigorous articulation of
inductive probability, see JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921).
33. M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 5 (1979).
34. KEYNES, supra note 32, at 34. At times, law and economics scholars acknowledge
the subjective nature of probability. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 31, at 55. Neverthe-
less, the implications of inductive probability on theory are not explored. See id.
35. A.J. AYER, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 28 (1972).
36. SEN, supra note 11, at 565.
37. See Rhee, supra note 4.
38. Richard Posner and William Landes are credited with formulating the standard
model. Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 4-5 n. 16. The literature should also recognize that Alan
Friedman made a substantial contribution to the economic literature in an earlier student note
[Vol. 78
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tion cost is added to the settlement value. We ignore for convenience the
cost of processing settlement, which is typically small compared to the
litigation cost.39 The key concept is expected value, defined as the ex-
pected judgment amount discounted by its probability. These relation-
ships are summarized in algebraic formulas where V is settlement valua-
tion, J expected judgment amount, P probability of judgment, and T
transaction cost. A defendant's maximum settlement value is Vd < J x P
+ T, and a plaintiffs minimum settlement value is Vp > J x P - T.40 As
long as the defendant's maximum value is greater than the plaintiffs
minimum value, there is a positive contract zone from which a settlement
may result. This cost-benefit analysis has been the cornerstone in the
economic study of legal bargaining, and it has remained remarkably du-
rable over the years.41
II. RISK AND VALUE
A. Asset Valuation
The first principle of financial economics is that risk and reward are
conjoined twins. The greater the expected return, the greater is the
valuation; but the greater the risk to that return, the less is the value.
Value is determined by "the future expected cash flow discounted at a
rate that reflects the riskiness of the cash flow." 42  This relationship is
captured in the process of discounting. This process adjusts the future
in the Stanford Law Review. The note set forth all the essential elements and arguments of the
standard model. Friedman, supra note 1. Posner, one of the leading proponents of the standard
model, states the valuational concept as follows: "The plaintiff's minimum offer is the ex-
pected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement costs, the expected value of the litiga-
tion being the present value of the judgment if he wins, multiplied by the probability (as he
estimates it) of his winning, minus the present value of his litigation expenses." Posner, supra
note 1, at 418; see Friedman, supra note 1, at 70-80.
39. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 1075 (assuming cost of settlement to be
"nil" given that it is so low compared to cost of litigation).
40. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568-69 (6th ed. 2003).
41. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 1075; Don L. Coursey & Linda R.
Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimen-
tal Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1988); Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 12-13
(adopting the expected value formulation of discounting with probability); Donald Wittman,
Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Genera-
tion of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988); see also Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986) ("Most defendants are unlikely to settle unless the cost of the pre-
dicted judgment, discounted by its probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation,
are greater than the cost of the settlement package.").
42. THOMAS E. COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE
VALUE OF COMPANIES 73 (2d ed. 1995).
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expected return for time value of money and discount for risk. Although
the time value of money is an important ministerial task, the more salient
point for the purpose of the theory of valuation is the discount for risk,
which is missing from the formulation of the standard model. 43 In the
calculation of true economic value, the present value (PV) equals the ex-
pected future value (FV) discounted by time and risk, such that PV = FV
* (1 + R)n where R is the discount rate and n is time. The discount rate R
incorporates a discount factor not only for the time value of money but
also for the risk of the investment. Intuitively, an uncertain expected dol-
lar should be worth less than a present certain dollar even if the time
value of money is disregarded. The process of discounting captures this
intuition.
In the financial market, risk is captured in the concept of cost of
capital. A firm uses capital to generate cashflows. Capital has a cost. If
the capital is debt, its cost is the yield on the debt less the tax shield for
interest expense deduction.44 The problem is calculating the cost of eq-
uity since dividends are not legally mandated. 45 Before the mid-1960s,
the market had no way to measure a firm's risk, and so the cost of capital
was incalculable. 46 The Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") solved
43. The formulation of the standard model suggests a time value adjustment. See Posner,
supra note 1, at 420-21; Friedman, supra note 1, at 78-79. This calculation is a ministerial
task of practical importance. The median time to trial in federal court is approximately 20
months. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 459, 480 (2004). If we assume a risk-
free rate of 5% to adjust for the time delay in payment, the time value adjustment is not incon-
sequential. If the expected value is $100, the discounted value for a period of 20 months is
$92 (= $100 - (1+5%)513). However, note that this discount is not a risk adjustment, but,
rather, a time value adjustment. By definition, the present value and the future values are the
same once the time value is adjusted, meaning that $92 now is the same as $100 to be received
20 months from now if that future payment is certain. Time value adjustment is a ministerial
point and really irrelevant to the theory of legal valuation. This article ignores this administra-
tive point. Rather, the larger issue is a discounting process for the risk, which assumes that the
future payment (judgment) is uncertain.
44. See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 42, at 247-49. Businesses can deduct interest ex-
pense from taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 162-163 (2000).
45. Most companies are not legally mandated to pay dividends. See FRANKLIN A.
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 153 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2004) (stating
that board of directors "may declare and pay dividends"). Certain regulated companies require
minimum levels of distributions to shareholders. See 26 U.S.C. § 857(a)(1) (2000) (requiring
that real estate investment trusts (REITs) distribute at least 90% of taxable income as divi-
dends).
46. Only recently, after the pioneering works of Markowitz, Sharpe, Black, and Scholes,
just to name a few, did risk become a quantitative endeavor. "Throughout most of the history
of stock markets.., it never occurred to anyone to define risk with a number. Stocks were
risky and some were riskier than others, and people let it go at that. Risk was in the gut, not in
the numbers." PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
247 (1996).
EFFECT OF RISK ON LEGAL VALUATION
this problem and provided a quantitative method for calculating the cost
of equity.47 Cost of equity is best understood as an opportunity cost of
capital. The greater the risk of a firm as measured against the market
risk, the greater should be a firm's cost of capital. This cost of capital is
the discount rate used to value a firm's future cashflow.
With the cost of equity problem solved, a rigorous valuation became
possible. The generally accepted technique is the discounted cash flow
(DCF) method. Under the DCF, value depends on expected cashflow
and the risk to that cashflow. The exercise is a two-step process: (1)
forecast the future cashflow, and (2) discount it by the cost of capital.
Similarly, the net present value (NPV) of a project calculates the true
economic profitability of an investment project. It weighs the initial
capital investment Ci against the future cashflows (Ct ... C) which are
discounted by the cost of capital.
Value is the sum of the risk-adjusted cashflow. The financial logic
is quite elegant. A firm uses capital to generate cashflow that belongs to
the shareholders. This capital is not free. An investment in a firm is
risky, and investors want a return for the risk taken. The future cashflow
must be discounted by the cost of capital, a measure of the firm's risk.
For higher risk investments, investors demand higher return; this sug-
gests a higher cost of capital charged to the firm, meaning that its ex-
pected cashflow will be discounted more. As a result, the firm's valua-
tion is diminished. For lower risk investments, the process is reversed.
In sum, the discounting process matches the return with the appropriate
risk level through the valuation process. Although the cost of equity is a
less accessible concept than the cash expense of the cost of debt, it is just
as real and consequential because the cost is imbedded in the firm's
valuation.48
47. The CAPM was jointly derived by William Sharpe, John Lintner, and Jack Treynor.
See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); Sharpe, supra note 5.
Treynor's article is not published. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 189 n.9. The
CAPM postulates that the cost of an asset is R = 3 (R. - Rf) + Rf, where Rf is the risk-free
rate, R,. the market return, and 13 the stock's beta (beta will be defined subsequently). Id. at
189. Beta is the important innovation. It is the comparative measure of the expected return
versus the market return. Id. at 167-68. Statistically, beta is the covariance of the stock return
to the market return over the variance of the market return. Id. at 170. A beta of 2.0 means
that when the market rises one percent, the stock is expected to rise two percent. Id. at 167.
48. These concepts are consistently seen in the financial market. Consider two storied
American companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange: Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS)
and General Electric (NYSE: GE). Goldman Sachs, the former firm of both Robert Rubin and
Henry Paulson, is the world's premier investment bank. See LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN
SACHS: Ti-E CULTURE OF SUCCESS (2000) (providing history of the firm). Investment bank-
ing is a complex business, entailing great risk-taking activities. On any given trade or deal, an
investment banking firm can gain or lose millions of dollars. GE is a premier diversified con-
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As evident, the concept of discounting for risk in a NPV analysis is
malleable to the legal context, where Ci represents the transaction cost of
litigation and C, is the anticipated judgment (expected value). But
equally evident is the incompleteness of the analogy. The missing ele-
ments of this analysis are the analytic equivalent of a discount rate in the
legal setting and the conceptual framework for risk-adjusted discounting
in valuation.
Thus, there are three points relevant to legal valuation: (1) increased
risk reduces the asset value of the firm; (2) the process of projecting a
forecast is distinct from the process of assessing the risk to that forecast;
and (3) the ex ante economic profitability of a transaction is determined
by projecting an expected cashflow and discounting it by its risk.
B. Option Valuation
An option is one of the most basic derivatives, security instruments
that derive their value from some other asset or variable. 49 A call option
is a contract wherein an issuer sells for a premium an option giving the
holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy from the issuer a specified
asset at a fixed strike price on or before a maturity date.50 At maturity, if
glomerate, providing everything from consumer products to jet engines. See Geoffrey Colvin,
What Makes GE Great?, FORTUNE, Mar. 6, 2006, at 50-53 (ranking GE the most admired
company for the sixth time in ten years). Its business is also complex, but the overall risk is
lower than that of an investment bank. As of the fiscal year 2005, GE and Goldman Sachs had
net incomes of $16.3 billion and $5.6 billion, respectively, a ratio of about 3:1. See General
Electric Statement of Earnings, http://www.ge.com/en/company/investor/ar/cfs-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006); Goldman Sachs 2005 Annual Report,
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm (follow "Annual Reports" hyperlink; then follow
"2005 Annual Report" hyperlink; choose "Online Version;" then follow "Financial High-
lights" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). But GE's market capitalization (about $350 bil-
lion) is nearly six times Goldman Sach's value (about $61 billion). See
http://finance.yahoo.com (as of Mar. 12, 2006). GE trades at a higher valuation than Goldman
Sachs even accounting for the 3:1 ratio difference in earnings. This is seen in its P/E multiple
of 21.8x earnings, compared to Goldman Sachs's 12.5x. See id. If Goldman Sachs was valued
at GE's multiple, it would have a market capitalization of about $123 billion. But the market
recognizes that the quality of the expected earnings of the two firms are different. It discounts
the value of firms, even a storied franchise like Goldman Sachs, having greater risk associated
with their expected cashflows.
49. JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (6th ed. 2006). Option
contracts have been traded since antiquity. Aristotle described financial options as devices
involving "a principle of universal application" and recounted how they were used to monopo-
lize the ancient olive oil market. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. 11 (1831), reprinted in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1142 (Richard McKeon ed., 2001).
50. See JOHN C. COX & MARK RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 1-3 (1985); HULL, su-
pra note 49, at 6-8. An "American" option can be exercised any time before or at maturity
whereas a "European" option can be exercised only at maturity. Black & Scholes, supra note
5, at 637.
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the market value of this asset is worth more than the strike price, the op-
tion is "in-the-money" and the holder profits since he has the right to buy
the asset at a below market price. 51 At any given point in time, the exer-
cise value of an option may be calculated. 52 If a call option is in-the-
money, the holder's profit is the stock price minus the exercise price and
the option premium. If it is out of the money, the exercise value is zero,
and thus the holder's loss is the option premium. The problem is that the
exercise value equals the option value only at maturity. Before maturity,
the option value is variable. The value depends on the interplay of six
variables: the current stock price, the strike price, time to maturity, the
variance of the stock, dividend yield, and the risk-free rate. For exam-
ple, time value alone adds value, i.e., the longer the maturity date the
greater should be the option value. 53 The complexity is great, and a the-
ory of option value was elusive.
In 1973, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes solved the problem. 54
Their option pricing formula is mathematically complex, but the solution
is based on the simple principle that the issuer of an option can hedge the
risk of the option being called against him by constructing a synthetic
portfolio of stock and debt that funds the purchase of the stock, both of
which are assets and liabilities that can be readily valued.55 Since a risk-
less arbitrage opportunity is unsustainable in a competitive market, 56 the
51. A put option gives the holder the right to sell a specified asset to the issuer. At matur-
ity, if the market value of this asset is worth less than the strike price, the option is "in-the-
money" and the holder profits since she has to the right to sell the asset at a more expensive
price. If an option is "out of the money," the holder will not exercise the option and the loss is
the option premium, which is the issuer's gain. An option transaction is zero-sum in that ab-
sent transaction costs, the issuer's loss is the holder's gain, and vice versa.
52. The profit or loss of the holder of a call option is V = max [(S - X - p), - p] where S
is the stock price, X is the strike price, and p is the option premium. If the payoff is negative,
meaning X > S at maturity, the option would not be exercised, the payoff would be zero, and
the loss would be the premium. The issuer's profit or loss is V = min [(X - S + p), p]. See
COX & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 3.
53. The lapse of time decays option value since the opportunity for the option to become
in-the-money diminishes. See Black & Scholes, supra note 5, at 638 ("Normally, the value of
an option declines as its maturity date approaches, if the value of the stock does not change.").
54. See id. at 641-42.
55. See id.
56. Arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities that creates a riskless
profit. See RANDALL S. BILLINGSLEY, UNDERSTANDING ARBITRAGE: AN INTUITIVE
APPROACH TO FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 2 (2006). Much of finance theory rests on the principle
that market participants will ruthlessly exploit riskless arbitrage opportunities, making such
opportunities unsustainable. Id. at 9-13. The possibility of arbitrage leads to the most funda-
mental principle of financial theory, the Principle of Absence of Arbitrage, which states that
there is always a tradeoff between risk and reward because, in the long term, there are no un-
bounded riskless gains. See FOCARDI & FABOZZI, supra note 17, 393; BILLINGSLEY, supra
note 56, at 8-9 (discussing the relationship between arbitrage and the Law of One Price). Ar-
bitrage keeps prices of the same assets consistent in spite of the different ways these assets
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value of the synthetic portfolio must always equal the value of the op-
tion. Under this model, increased variance of the underlying asset in-
creases option value.57 The intuition is that since an option derives its
value from an underlying asset, the more the value of that asset has a
propensity to move, regardless of direction, the more chance there is that
it will exceed the strike price.58 This being the case, the synthetic portfo-
lio, which hedges the issuer's risk of having the option called against
him, must hold a greater portion of the underlying stock in the event the
stock price exceeds the exercise price. Thus, the synthetic portfolio
value increases with an increase in the stock holding, meaning that the
option value must also increase.
The uses of options are relevant to legal valuation. Options are
primarily used for "hedging or speculation; that is, they can be used ei-
ther to reduce risks or to take risks." 59 A hedge is a risk mitigation
measure. In the gaming context, it is an additional bet placed to offset the
potential loss from another bet.60 In the market context, a hedge reduces
or eliminates the risk of an investment through a secondary transaction
that offsets any potential loss.61 Another use of a derivative is specula-
tion through leveraged investment. Whereas hedging reduces risk, lever-
age allows an investor to assume greater risk for greater reward. 62
This short discussion highlights two points relevant to legal valua-
tion: (1) the more risky an underlying asset, the greater is the option
value-all else being equal, option holders prefer "riskier" assets and op-
tion issuers prefer "safer" ones; and (2) options are double edged swords
as they can be used to hedge or leverage risk. For less risk-averse or
risk-seeking investors, options provide opportunities for speculation and
higher returns. For more risk-averse investors, they provide a way to re-
duce or eliminate uncertainty in the value fluctuation of an underlying
may be packaged.
57. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 566-67 (providing example of option calcula-
tion through the construction of a synthetic portfolio); Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 50, at
33-34 (same).
58. While variance is an important factor in valuation, assumptions about its direction are
irrelevant. This is an ingenious insight by Black and Scholes: "[i]f the hedge is maintained
continuously, then the approximations mentioned above become exact, and the return on the
hedged position is completely independent of the change in the value of the stock." Black &
Scholes, supra note 5, at 641.
59. HULL, supra note 49, at 541. Derivatives, such as options, have many uses. See Cox
& RUBENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 44-59.
60. BILLINGSLEY, supra note 56, at 9.
61. Id. For example, one way to think about an insurance policy is as a put option. It
protects the insured against the risk of a downside movement in the value of the underlying
asset.
62. Options can be used to structure a portfolio where the returns on the option would be
greater than buying the underlying stock. See Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 45-46.
[Vol. 78
EFFECT OF RISK ON LEGAL VALUATION
asset.
C. Duality of Risk
The above discussion shows that the effect of risk on value is bipo-
lar. Normally, investors in a capital asset consider "yield to be a good
thing; risk, a bad thing; and gambling, to be avoided. '63 In the case of
options, however, the general rule is the mirror opposite since the holder
of an option prefers greater risk. As between option and asset valuations
then, risk plays a dual role. The standard text on corporate finance de-
scribes the impact of risk on assets and options:
In most financial settings, risk is a bad thing; you have to be paid to
bear it. Investors in risky (high-beta) stocks demand higher expected
rates of return. High risk capital investment projects have correspond-
ingly high costs of capital and have to beat higher hurdle rates to
achieve positive NPV [net present value].
For options it's the other way around. As we have just seen, options
written on volatile assets are worth more than options written on safe
assets. If you can understand and remember that one fact about op-
tions, you've come a long way.64
Principles of financial economics provide the most appropriate ana-
lytic framework to conceptualize the value of a lawsuit. But their appli-
cation requires a resolution of the option-asset dichotomy and a proper
characterization of the essential nature of a lawsuit.
III. REAL OPTION ANALYSIS
A. Grundfest-Huang Option Model
A lawsuit has attributes of an option. The decision standard of a de-
liberative body can be thought of as the strike price. The plaintiff is said
to hold a call option, which the legal institution forces the defendant to
issue. 65 Upon a finding of liability, the call option is in-the-money and
63. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 91.
64. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 557.
65. See Cornell, supra note 10, at 175 ("When a lawsuit is filed, the defendant is forced
to write litigation options at prices that depend on the plaintiff's cost of pursuing the suit.");
Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1288 ("When a plaintiff files a lawsuit, the plaintiff ac-
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the judgment amount determines the parties' profit or loss. Given the
apparent optionality of a lawsuit, some scholars have applied option pric-
ing concepts to lawsuit valuation. 66 An early proponent of option theory
was Bradford Cornell, who applied a variation of the binomial option
pricing model to value litigation. 67 This model depends on calculating
the potential distribution and probabilities of outcomes, and then works
backwards to calculate the "option" price value of a lawsuit.
Recently, Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang incorporated previous
works in the field and proposed a formal model of litigation valuation. 68
They argue that a lawsuit is a real option (an option embedded in a real
asset),69 and this option analysis should apply. Their model generates
closed-form solutions that provide "precise equilibrium estimates of liti-
gation's option settlement value" and identify the determinants of
value.70 Consistent with option theory, their key conclusion is that "if
the variance of the information is sufficiently large, the lawsuit's real op-
tion settlement value will exceed its single-stage expected settlement
value. '71 Since the Grundfest-Huang real option model is the most com-
prehensive argument for the application of option pricing theory as a
general framework for legal valuation, it merits close study.
quires a call option whose terminal value is defined by the lawsuit's judgment upon its conclu-
sion."). Unlike a financial option, a lawsuit is not zero-sum because both parties incur transac-
tion costs. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1289.
66. See Bebchuk, supra note 13; Cornell, supra note 10; Grundfest & Huang, supra note
9.
67. Cornell, supra note 10; see BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 570-75 (discussing the
binomial option pricing model); Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 171-78 (same).
68. The works of Bebchuk and Cornell are antecedents. Grundfest & Huang, supra note
9, at 1290-91; see Bebchuk, supra note 13; Cornell, supra note 10.
69. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 886-94
(2d ed. 2001). Assets are typically valued on the principles of DCF, CAPM and NPV. Not all
financial projects are "buy and hold" projects. At any given time a project can be expanded,
shrunk, abandoned, delayed, or otherwise modified from the original plan. Where there are
contingencies in a project, real option analysis may apply. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note
27, at 597-614. There are two types of real options that have application to legal bargain.
First is the option to delay a project. See id. at 602-03. By delaying the project with the right
to proceed, an investor can wait until new information suggests that the project would be NPV
positive or the projected cashiflows are more certain. This is particularly the case when the
variance in the project is high. The second real option is the option to abandon a project. See
id at 605-10. Here, a financial project is initiated upon estimation of a positive NPV, but sub-
sequently the expected cashflow is less than previously anticipated. There is value to the op-
tion to abandon a project. See id. at 605.
70. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1291. The authors support their work with for-
mal propositions and mathematical proofs. See id. at 1328-36. In contrast, Cornell notes in his
article that the goal "is not to provide precise estimates of the value of litigation options, but to
offer general insights into how such options affect the incentive to sue." Cornell, supra note
10, at 176.
71. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1295.
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The argument begins by criticizing the standard economic model of
bargaining, which is attributed as deriving from the asset pricing princi-
ples of the DCF (discounted cash flow) and NPV (net present value)
models. 72 The standard model fails to account for the effect of variance
on the value of lawsuits since the determinants are probability, judgment
amount, and transaction cost.73 For example, if we simplify litigation
expectations as binary outcomes, it is irrelevant whether the expected
outcomes are [100, 0] or [51, 49] since the expected value for both is 50.
With risk neutrality as the assumption, one is indifferent to variance.
Under a real option analysis, however, variance can increase valuation.
A series of numeric examples give an intuitive understanding of the
formal mathematical model. The analysis first examines a positive ex-
pected value (PEV) lawsuit, defined as a case where the expected value
exceeds the litigation costs. 74 The case has an expected value of 100
with litigation costs of 70. Under the standard model, the plaintiffs
minimum settlement value is 30, and the defendant's maximum value is
170. With equitable bargaining, the parties settle at the expected value of
100. Complexity is then introduced by splitting the litigation process
into two stages with equally allocated transaction cost (35 per stage).75
This allows an analysis via backward induction. Backward induction
considers the strategic decisions of the parties at a future point in time
and then works backwards to determine the optimal strategy.76 The logic
is that the consequences of a present decision depend on the expected fu-
ture decisions of the parties; thus, future choices are analyzed first, and
an inductive analysis works backwards to suggest the optimal present
choice.
With the litigation split into two time periods, the key assumption is
"that the information to be disclosed at the end of the first period is a rul-
ing on a question of law that has a value of either A = 400 or B = -200
and that the probability of each outcome is 0.5, as previously de-
scribed."'77 This changes the variance of the outcome, but still preserves
the expected value of 100. At Stage 1, the parties litigate and spend 35
in transaction costs. At Stage 2, if the court rules A, the expected value
would be 400; the plaintiff would settle for 365; the defendant would set-
tle for 435; with equitable bargaining, the parties would settle at 400.78 If
72. Id. at 1272-74; see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
73. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1276.
74. Id. at 1293-94 (discussing the illustrative case).
75. This analysis of multistage litigation borrows the technique first applied by Bebchuk.
See Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 7-9.
76. Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 6 & n.7.
77. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1294.
78. Note that the 35 in transaction cost spent in Stage I is irrelevant because it is a sunk
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the court rules B, the plaintiff would have no credible threat to continue
the lawsuit since she would incur a cost of 35 for a payoff of -200;
knowing this, the defendant would offer nothing; the plaintiff would
abandon the lawsuit; the settlement value would be 0. Thus, just before
the revelation of the selection of A or B, the expected value would be
200. Applying backward induction at the beginning of Stage 1, the
plaintiff reasons that she would spend 35 to reach a settlement of 200 at
the end of Stage 1, and, so, she values settlement at 165. The defendant
reasons the same and values settlement at 235. With equitable bargain-
ing, the parties settle for 200-a most startling outcome given that it is
twice the expected value of 100 predicted by the standard model. 79
The next analysis is a negative expected value (NEV) case, defined
as a case where the litigation cost exceeds the expected value.80 The
standard model suggests that these cases should never be brought be-
cause they lack credibility. When, however, the lawsuit is divided into
stages, some NEV cases can have positive value.81 The reasoning goes
like this. Assume an expected value of 100 with transaction cost of 140.
Under the standard model, the expected value is -40, making the case
worthless. This case is then split into two time periods with a cost of 70
per period and backward induction is applied. The plaintiff would spend
70 to reach Stage 2, at which point he would spend another 70 to win 100
in expected value at trial; 82 thus, he would accept a settlement of 30 at
the beginning of Stage 2. Reasoning similarly, the defendant would offer
cost. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 116 ("Sunk costs are like spilled milk: They are past
and irreversible outflows. Because sunk costs are bygones, they cannot be affected by the deci-
sion to accept or reject the project, and so they should be ignored.").
79. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1294-95. Variance is a key determinant. At
low to medium levels of variance, settlement values are identical to those from the standard
model. Value is 100 when the variance between A and B are [100, 100], [165, 35] and [165 -
€, 35 + c] where F represents an arbitrarily small positive number. Id. at 1295-96. But, there
is a point where settlement value experiences a "discontinuity." Id at 1297. When variance is
changed slightly to [165 + E, 35 - c], value suddenly decreases to (82.5 + F/2). This precipi-
tous drop in value results because B becomes a noncredible option given that no plaintiff
would spend a transaction cost of 35 to pursue an expected judgment of 35 - F, and, so, only A
would have value. Id. at 1295-96. As variance increases, however, settlement value increases
monotonically at a rate measured by A/2, the intuition being that as A rises, the value of the
real option rises as well. Id. at 1297, 1298 fig. 1. Thus, when the variance between A and B
reach [400, -200], settlement value reaches 200, or double the value from the standard model.
Id. at 1298 fig.I.
80. Id. at 1299.
81. This part of the analysis is borrowed from Bebchuk. Id. at 1299-1301. See Bebchuk,
supra note 13.
82. If the plaintiff litigates in Stage 1, the decision to continue litigation in Stage 2 is ra-
tional. The cost spent in Stage 1 is sunk cost, and thus should be irrelevant to the decision at
Stage 2 under the American rule of attorney fees. It is a question of whether the initial deci-
sion to pursue litigation at Stage 1 is rational or not. See infra Part IV.B.
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170 to settle at this point. With equitable bargaining, the parties would
settle at 100. At the beginning of Stage 1, each party understands that a
cost expenditure of 70 would result in a settlement of 100 at the begin-
ning of Stage 2. As a result, the plaintiff would settle at 30 and the de-
fendant would settle at 170. Once again, the outcome is quite surprising:
even though in a single stage analysis the expected value of the litigation
is -40, with equitable bargaining, the parties settle at 100 at the begin-
ning of Stage 1.
The real option model allows variance to affect value. Assume that
judicial decisions A and B determine the binomial outcomes [180, 20]
with the transaction cost of 140 divisible into two stages (a NEV case
under the standard model since the expected outcome is -40). If the
court selects A, the plaintiff would spend an additional 70 in Stage 2 to
get a judgment of 180, inducing the plaintiff to settle for 110. Reasoning
the same, the defendant would pay 250 to settle. With equitable bargain-
ing, the parties would settle at 180. If, however, the court selects B, the
plaintiff's claim loses credibility and the case is worthless. The expected
value of A and B would be 90. At Stage 1, the parties realize that each
would spend 70 in costs to settle at 90 at Stage 2, and so they would set-
tle at 20 and 160. With.equitable bargaining, they would settle at 90, or
10 less than the lawsuit's expected value. 83 As the authors explain it,
"introducing a learning option into an environment where an abandon-
ment option is already present does not invariably increase a lawsuit's
settlement value, particularly if variance is not sufficiently large." 84
Consistent with the payout profile of a call option, which increases
monotonically without limit upon surpassing the strike price, litigation
value increases monotonically with an increase in variance. For exam-
ple, with binary outcomes [200, 0], settlement value is 100; with [300, -
100], it is 150; with [400, -200], it is 200; with [500, -300], it is 250, and
so forth.85 Theoretically, this means that the potential payout of a law-
suit is infinite, consistent with the characteristic of a call option. In a call
option, the realistic expectation of the potential profit is the upper limit
of expected share price. Similarly, although the point is not made clear,
one presumes that the litigation payout is bounded by the rational limit of
the value of the injury. 86
83. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1301.
84. Id. at 1301.
85. See id. at 1303 fig.2. "Indeed, every NEV lawsuit can be made credible if one as-
sumes a sufficiently large variance, just as the value of every out-of-the-money call option can
be increased to exceed any fixed premium value if the variance of the underlying instrument is
allowed to become sufficiently large." Id. at 1316.
86. Aside from the rational judgment of deliberative bodies, various legal mechanisms
cap judgments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (2000) (providing caps on compensatory
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A number of other examples are given to show how the valuations
from option pricing theory diverge from the prediction of the standard
model, 87 but the above examples are sufficient to show how the model
basically works. While the real option model is technically detailed, the
thesis is straightforward. The most important and admirable innovation
is the incorporation of variance into valuation. Variance must affect
value, but, as the authors correctly note, the standard model fails to ac-
count for it. The key conclusion under an option price theory is that
"once variance becomes sufficiently large, the effect of an increase in
variance is an unambiguous increase in a lawsuit's option settlement
value." 88 This conclusion is the inevitable end of applying option pric-
ing theory to the general framework of legal valuation.
B. Critique of Real Option Analysis
The attributes of optionality in a lawsuit are not disputed. The ques-
tion is whether option theory provides the general analytic framework, or
whether it is a technique to value the procedural option to pursue trial
vis-A-vis the value of the disputed substantive right. This distinction is
important because the value of a lawsuit has two parts: the larger part is,
of course, the value of the underlying substantive right that is the basis of
the claim or injury, and the ancillary part is the procedural right to opt for
trial. Despite the many innovations and keen insights offered by the
Grundfest-Huang real option model, the general application of option
theory to value a lawsuit raises a number of problems: (1) the use of
backward induction in the litigation context of imperfect information and
multistage processes, (2) the limited concept of variance, (3) the problem
and punitive damages in civil rights cases); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 410 (2003) (suggesting that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between pu-
nitive and compensatory damages . will satisfy due process."); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 482-83 (1934) (discussing remittitur).
87. The authors find that all PEV lawsuits are credible. On the other hand, NEV lawsuits
are credible only at certain levels of sufficiently large variance. Grundfest & Huang, supra
note 9, at 1301-02. "In addition, some NEV lawsuits exhibit an intriguing pattern in which
they are credible for sufficiently low levels of variance, lose credibility over intermediate lev-
els of variance, and then regain credibility over sufficiently high levels of variance." Id. at
1302. Based on backward induction, the pattern of returns is: (1) where 100 < A < 130 - F,
settlement value is 100; (2) where 130:5 A < 140, the lawsuit is noncredible and so settlement
value is 0 (a "dead zone" in the settlement range); (3) where A = 140 + c, settlement value is
70 + 6/2; and (4) where A increases in value thereafter, settlement value increases monotoni-
cally. Id. at 1302-03, 1303 fig.2.
88. Id, at 1316. This is consistent with Cornell's conclusion: "[b]ecause the value of an
option grows when the variance of the underlying random variable rises, increasing uncer-
tainty regarding court awards will make filing a lawsuit a more attractive investment." See
Cornell, supra note 10, at 182.
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of perspective, and (4) the implication on risk-reward preferences of par-
ties. These issues are addressed in order.
1. Backward Induction
Backward induction does not apply well to litigation. It is most use-
ful in games of complete and perfect information, where the parameters
are limited and the time horizon is finite. 89 In these closed-form prob-
lems, a dominant strategy may emerge based on a projection of the deci-
sions at the end point of a decision tree. When the decision tree becomes
complex (like the game of chess) or information is not perfect or com-
plete (like the game of litigation), backward induction cannot predict op-
timum solutions. 90 Thus, backward induction is more useful when com-
plexity and opportunities for slight deviations from the optimal strategy
are minimized.9 1
Of course, litigation is hardly a game of perfect and complete in-
formation, and mutual cooperation is often opportunistically engaged as
a strategy.92 Uncertainty begets the lawsuit.93 An agreement as to the
89. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 400-01 (1990).
90. See id at 401-02; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 163-64 (1994).
91. A popular example shows how backward induction leads to misleading and poor re-
sults. See KREPS, supra note 89, at 401-02; BAIRD ET AL., supra note 90, at 163-64. The
game is a long series of decisions at divisible points { 1 ... n}. At each point, a player may
keep proceeding towards the final end point n (option A) or terminate the game early with an
alternative payoff (option B). Think of a long centipede where the series of option A at points
I I ... n} connect to form the long body of a centipede and option B at each node forms the
many sets of centipede legs. Each decision is based on a complete information set (i.e., the
payoffs are known). If both players select option A all the way through to the final point n, the
payoffs for Players 1 and 2 are [100, 100]. At the penultimate point (n - 1), the alternative
payoffs for option B are [101, 98]; at (n - 2), the alternative payoffs are [99, 99]. The alterna-
tive payoffs continue to diminish down the chain with slight differences that incentivize selec-
tion of option B for one or the other party. At point 0, the alternative payoffs are [0, 0]. Now,
consider the decision at point (n - 1). Player 1 would select option B with the 101 payoff
rather than proceed to the final point n where the payoff is 100. Knowing this, Player 2 would
select option B at point (n - 2) with a 99 payoff rather than proceed with option A to (n - 1)
where the payoff would be 98 if Player 1 selects option B. Backward induction unravels this
chain down to the root where neither party engages in what would otherwise be a profitable
transaction at point n. The predicted solution is that each party would select a payoff of 0
rather than 100, a patently irrational result. The process of backward induction places "un-
usual weight on the assumption that the payoffs that the parties enjoy are common knowl-
edge." BAIRD ET AL., supra note 90, at 164. There must be mutual rationality and trust over a
prolonged period where slight deviations in expected behavior undermine the optimal solution.
See KREPS, supra note 89, at 402 ("[M]any rounds of iterated dominance is sometimes a bit
too much to believe.").
92. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1318 ("It is well understood, however, that
litigation is a highly imperfect process.").
93. "One of the primary causes of disagreements between adverse parties is the vague-
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outcome of a case should result in settlement, 94 and thus backward in-
duction is really irrelevant. The more difficult question in settlement is
not whether the parties agree on the outcome of the case, but whether
they can agree on the price of the lawsuit despite differences in predicted
outcome or confidence therein. Like a financial market that exists be-
cause traders disagree on value, the legal market exists only because par-
ties disagree on the proper valuation of the disputed right. Sometimes,
parties agree on all relevant determinants of value, and they settle.
Sometimes, however, lawsuits are settled despite disagreements over the
expected outcome because the parties can still agree on a range of mutu-
ally acceptable prices. These points are analyzed in greater detail later in
Section VI of this article.
In fairness, the use of backward induction is a simplifying assump-
tion, a heuristic used to analyze the effect of variance. Even so, Grund-
fest and Huang suggest that a real option analysis offers techniques for
"quantifying the often subjective uncertainty" and posit that a working
option pricing model of litigation valuation is possible.95 This argument,
ness of the legal decision standard; the more vague the standard, the greater the uncertainty as
to any given case's outcome, and the greater the probability of litigation." O'Connell et al,
supra note 31, at 272; see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict
Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J.
ECON. 157, 169 (Summer 1988) ("The principal uncertainties revolved around likely legal
judgments that both parties had equivalent capacities to predict.").
94. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 402 (2004)
("It is clear that if the plaintiff and the defendant have the same beliefs about the trial outcome,
then there should always exist mutually beneficial settlements, because they can each escape
trial costs by settling."); Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 17 ("In litigation, as in gambling,
agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop out.").
95. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1283 (stating the model provides "techniques for
quantifying the often subjective uncertainty that arises in.. . lawsuits"). I do not believe that
lawsuits are suited for quantitative modeling on an individual basis, though it is sometimes
nice to think what might be. A model may be analytically sound for the purpose of conceptual
understanding, but lack practical application. Scholars in finance have noted that the theory of
real option meets the practical difficulties of application. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27,
at 614-15; DAMODARAN, supra note 69, at 892-93, 899, 904. Real options are easier to con-
ceive than to apply. Where the option has many variables, quantification may be impossible as
a practical matter. Hard numbers must be generated to feed a formal model, but I question
how they would be generated and whether a numeric output is any more accurate or predictive
than the subjective views generated through the unquantifiable workings of human intelli-
gence. The real option must be valued in relation to the options that are available to the com-
petitor, and so game theory, a separate branch of economics, cannot be operationally separated
from real option valuation. Lawsuits as a collective whole can be subject to modeling, particu-
larly for repeat players such as insurance companies, because they can be thought of as a ran-
dom mass phenomenon (unpredictable in the individual case but bearing a certain proportion
on the whole). See GEORGE POLYA, MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING 56 (1968).
Even so, the limitations of proper categorization are daunting, and any such data must be taken
with a rather large grain of salt. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 20-22, on file with au-
thor). Of course, the capability of aggregate analysis should not be imputed to an individual
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however, fails to consider that uncertainty is the essential characteristic
of a lawsuit. The broader criticism is that objective probabilistic predic-
tions of the outcomes are notoriously difficult, if not impossible to ascer-
tain. If probabilities were standard fare, much of the work of the legal
profession would give way to a new profession of legal risk analysts and
a primary or derivative market in legal claims. The application of back-
ward induction to predict litigation behavior is suspect as a theoretical
device and unrealistic as a practical matter.96
2. Variance in Lawsuits
The definition of variance and its use in the real option model is
conceptually troubling. Consider the example of a PEV (positive ex-
pected value) lawsuit in which the binary outcomes are A = 400 and B =
-200. The analysis produces a litigation value of 200 even though the
expected value is 100. However, this technique uses a numeric artifice.
How can a plaintiff incur a negative payoff greater than the transaction
cost?9 7 The authors note this conceptual difficulty:
However, as explained in greater detail below, this example of PEV
litigation settling for an amount greater than its corresponding single-
state expected value arises only because we have assumed that the
variance of the information disclosed is large enough to cause the
value of B to be negative. Indeed, because of our assumption that the
underlying distribution is binomial and mean preserving, it can be
proved that if the value of B is constrained to be nonnegative then
this lawsuit would settle for no more than its equivalent single-stage
expected value of 100. This feature of our model can, however, be
shown to be an artifact of our simplifying assumption that the under-
lying probability distribution is binomial. 98
party in theory or in practice. This information is available only to highly sophisticated repeat
players who are incentivized to expend the cost of procuring such data. Moreover, even with
such data, the analysis of any given lawsuit should focus on the unique facts and circumstances
of the case rather than some aggregate average, lest the party risk making decisions on the ba-
sis of irrelevant noise rather than information.
96. Empirical evidence suggests that the perfect equilibrium solutions derived from
backward inductive process have "little predictive power." See Jack Ochs & Alvin E. Roth,
An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 355 (1989).
97. A plaintiffs economic payoff can only fall below the transaction cost if there is a
counterclaim. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1286 n.65. But, this special case does not
change the analysis. Id. 1293-95. It simply means that the parties reverse roles. The lawsuit
can just as easily be broken down into its various claims, and the standard analysis would ap-
ply to each part.
98. Id. at 1295; see also id. at 1287 n.65 ("Given the constraints of such a distribution,
the only possible means of generating a sufficiently large variance is, on occasion, by assum-
2007]
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The concept of a negative payoff is more jarring given that a lawsuit
is analogized to a call option. 99 The maximum loss from holding a call
option is the option premium, which is the price the holder paid for the
option right. In the case of a lawsuit, the premium is identified as the
transaction cost. The problem stems from the requirement of a mean
preserving condition. Consider two hypothetical lawsuits, each with
transaction cost of 70 per party, divisible into two stages. Each case has
equal probability, judicial decisions A and B with payoffs of [200, 0],
and [ 100, 100]. Both lawsuits have an expected value of 100, but vari-
ance differs significantly. The first is high risk, and the other is riskless.
These dramatic variations would suggest differences in valuation, but the
application of the real option analysis produces the same result as the
standard model. This result is inconsistent with option pricing theory
and the principle that variance must affect valuation. 100
Only when the artifice of a negative payoff is assumed does the real
option model produce a valuation in excess of the expected value. Real-
izing this problem, the authors explain that "if we assume that the distri-
bution is lognormal (an assumption that would significantly complicate
our analysis), then negative returns to the plaintiff are not necessary for
the option value of a two-stage PEV settlement to diverge from its
equivalent single-stage expected value." 10 1 But this assumption creates
further dissonance. In most contested actions the distribution does not
take a lognormal distribution. The distribution of a meritorious action, if
it exists at all, would be bimodal since trial outcomes would be split
along some proportion between findings of no liability and liability, and
judgments on liability may cluster around some mean value. 10 2 A log-
ing a negative value of B.").
99. Id. at 1288.
100. The result is more puzzling if we consider intermediate cases that produce "disconti-
nuities." See supra note 79. As discussed before, if the expected outcomes are [180, 20], the
settlement value is 90. Applying the same valuation technique, a case of [150, 50] yields a
value of 75. If we reduce the variance even more to [130, 70], the value is 65. The import of
these calculations is that value diminishes as the parties reduce the variance of expectation. If
the expectation changes to [130 - E, 70 + E], the value suddenly jumps from 65 to 100. Other
than the mathematical method that produces these calculations, there is no empirical evidence
that supports the proposition that greater certainty in the expected outcomes of a lawsuit di-
minishes its value. Rather, the commonsensical prediction is that the valuation "firms up"
with a reduced spread of possible outcomes.
101. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1295; see also id. at 1287 n.65 ("If, however, we
assume different forms of probability distributions that are truncated to have no negative val-
ues, such as the lognormal, then none of these interpretive issues arises and the qualitative re-
sults of our model remain unchanged.").
102. Such an assumption runs into the obvious problem of fitting a particular case into a
particular class for the purpose of forming the distribution. Should all securities class actions
constitute a class? All tort cases? Negligence cases only? All cases in the district of Arizona?
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normal distribution would be an oddity rather than the norm, and it better
describes a frivolous or low success case than most contested actions in
which the distribution of outcomes have a range of expected out-
comes. 103
At the root of these interpretative difficulties is the definition of
variance. In the real option model, variance is the type of risk that pro-
duces "sudden changes" to assessment from one procedural state to an-
other. 10 4  This definition limits the application of the model. These
abrupt changes result from three common developments: disclosure of
"smoking gun" evidence that changes the entire complexion of a case, a
mid-litigation ruling that changes the legal theory, or the granting of a
dispositive motion that dismisses the case. 10 5 Without such sudden in-
ter-procedural changes, "a lawsuit's option settlement value can equal
the expected value of the judgment as calculated through traditional DCF
(discounted cash flow) or NPV (net present value) techniques."' 10 6 Ac-
cordingly, the real option model can be interpreted "more narrowly" in
the minority of cases that are subject to pretrial dispositions, 107 which are
the types of cases that had little chance of viability in the first place. 108
In the aggregate, the success levels of plaintiffs and defendants are substantially above 0 per-
cent and below 100 percent. See Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 18-19 (positing that the rate
of success for plaintiffs at trial will be close to 50 percent). But see Daniel Kessler, Thomas
Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal
Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (1996)
("[E]xtensive empirical literature has documented that plaintiffs win far fewer than half of
their cases."). However, from this obvious point, it is difficult to define a class from which a
distribution is inferred.
103. Consider a medical malpractice action in which the key determinant is the issue of
negligence. Assume that an average award upon liability is $2 million. If the exact case was
tried one hundred times, we would finally see the elusive distribution from which we may infer
a statistical probability. If the case is close, we may see a bimodal distribution. Assume for
argument that the breakdown of judgments is precisely binomial: 50 cases (no liability) and 50
cases ($2 million). Applying the process of backward induction, the parties would settle at the
expected value of $1 million. Now, inject a bit of reality into the hypothetical. What would
happen if the variance of outcomes is increased while preserving the mean? We can imagine a
more realistic distribution that looks like this: 50 cases of no liability, 5 cases of $0.5 million
judgments, 10 cases of $1 million, 20 cases of $2 million, 10 cases of $3 million, and 5 cases
of $3.5 million. The expected value is still $1 million, except that the variance now is greater.
Under the real option model, the value still equals the prediction of the standard model.
104. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1278.
105. Id. at 1279 (discussing claims that hinge "critically on the testimony of a single
witness or on the outcome of a key judicial ruling").
106. Id. at 1295.
107. "Thus, the model can be interpreted more narrowly so that the information disclosed
at the beginning of Stage 2 is precisely the sort of information that is in fact correlated with
dismissal by court order with no subsequent effort to reinstitute the claim." Id. at 1288 n.67;
see sources cited supra note 20 and accompanying text (dismissals are in the range of about 20
percent of filed cases).
108. See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Legal assessment is ordinarily a cumulative process. A case as-
sessment follows a "random walk" during which the starting assessment
may deviate significantly from the final assessment or outcome. Many
contested lawsuits do not undergo dramatic changes from one preceding
procedural stage to the next. No doubt that in any given case there are
key rulings and disclosures, but these events typically form the basis for
the random walk. A case ordinarily starts with a degree of uncertainty
that diminishes to a level where each party becomes more confident in
the assessment. If this observation describes a majority of lawsuits, the
two-stage model is irrelevant since most changes in risk profile between
various procedural states are incremental rather than seismic.
The concept of uncertainty can be distinguished in finer grades.
Variance is better defined as the potential deviation of current assess-
ment, at whatever point in the procedural process, from the final out-
come. This analytic framework more resembles the single-stage model.
Under this definition, variance is a proxy for the confidence one has in
the assessment. 10 9 Consider the situation where only a small fraction of
the evidence has been disclosed so far, and this evidence unambiguously
suggests that the defendant is liable. 110 The plaintiff may assess the
probability of liability as high given the known facts, but cannot be too
confident in this assessment. Variance impacts the degree of confidence
one has in the expectation of the trial outcome (a similar concept to a
confidence interval in statistics).lll We know from experience that cer-
tain cases are high variance (e.g., securities class actions), 112 and this risk
is reduced marginally through the litigation process up to the trial ver-
dict, while other cases are less volatile in their outcomes (e.g., routine
auto accidents).1 1 3 Variance as a legal concept goes to the level of con-
109. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 29-35, on file with author).
110. Cf George Lowenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Ex-
change and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (2004) ("[S]hared informa-
tion, if open to multiple interpretations, is likely to be interpreted egocentrically by the dispu-
tants, which can cause beliefs to diverge rather than converge.").
111. In statistics, a confidence interval is calculated as a function of the available data set.
BULMER, supra note 33, at 164-68; EDWIN L. CROW, FRANCES A. DAVIS & MARGARET W.
MAXFIELD, STATISTICS MANUAL 18 (1960). Sometimes, probability and confidence get con-
fused. When a person says, "I'm 99 percent sure of X," there are two potential meanings in
ordinary speech: (1) the statement could mean "if the event were to repeat 100 times, I believe
X will occur 99 times;" or (2) it could also mean "I believe more likely than not that X will
occur, and I am very confident of my prediction." The first comment is a comment on true
probability, and the second comment is actually a statement of confidence.
112. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Action, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (discussing high risk of securities class
actions).
113. See, e.g., LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 133-35 (1970) (noting that simple cases are "routinized"
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fidence one has in a probability assessment, particularly since objective
data is lacking.
Variance can also describe the relationship between frequency of an
adverse judgment and severity of the judgment amount. Consider a case
where the probability of liability is small, but a finding of liability may
mean an extraordinary payout. 114 Imagine a case where the payouts are
[1000, 0] with corresponding probabilities of 1 and 99 percent. The ex-
pected value is 10. In these types of cases, rational parties may settle at a
value higher than the expected value. In his study of insurance settle-
ments, Laurence Ross observed that insurance companies may offer
"danger value," which is a premium in excess of the expected value, to
eliminate exposure to a potentially severe jury verdict.11 5 This is surpris-
ing since insurance companies are pure players in the risk trade and are
viewed as being risk neutral. The effect of risk on insurers, however, is
more subtle. Insurers build in a premium to the price when the risk is
unusual or particularly incalculable, 116 and the same concept is at work
in the claims process. In both the front-end of underwriting and the
back-end of claims processing, the goal of an insurer, a pure trader in
risk, is to smooth out potentially violent swings in expected outcomes
since volatility of earnings increases its cost of capital. Thus, high vari-
ance of outcomes is not a positive economic trait even for a typically risk
neutral person.
3. Problem of Perspective
The real option model lacks a degree of perspective, a connection
between theory and empirical observation, particularly in the analysis of
NEV (negative expected value) cases. Recall that a case with an ex-
in insurance claims process). However, the forecasting of judicial outcomes is "certainly more
complex and more sensitive to the particular aspects of a given claim than the procedure used
in routine cases." Id. at 115. Factfinding always involves "a measure of speculation and con-
jecture." Lavender v. Kum, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
114. In insurance, the underwriting of low frequency, high severity risks poses unique dif-
ficulties. See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 473-74 (2005)
(stating insurance can cover unusual risks).
115. ROSS, supra note 113, at 202. Ross justified the rationality of danger pay on the basis
of transaction cost savings. Id. at 203.
116. In underwriting, insurance premium is determined by the following formula: P = E(S)
+ k + R where E(S) is the expected value of the claim, k is the operating expenses, and R is a
"risk premium which allows for coverage of unforeseen deviations in the claims amount to be
paid." See ERIC BRIYS & FRANCOIS DE VARENNE, INSURANCE: FROM UNDERWRITING TO
DERIVATIVES 6 (2001). Obviously, the greater this potential unforeseen deviation, the greater
would be the risk premium.
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pected judgment of 100 and transaction cost of 140 may still produce a
settlement value of 100 even though the expected value is -40. While
the precise mathematical procedure deriving this result is clear, what is
unclear is its relationship to the empirical world. Most NEV cases are
either not brought or are settled for nominal nuisance value, absent mis-
take or incompetence. In the real option model, the large settlement
value of an NEV case rests on the assumption that a plaintiff would pur-
sue a losing case on a limited basis. If this threat is not credible, a defen-
dant will not settle. The plaintiff likewise understands this. This situa-
tion creates a problem of strategy.
While PEV (positive expected value) cases are positive-yielding, an
NEV case is a speculative endeavor. Under a real option analysis, a
positive settlement value is not a certainty or even a reasonable expecta-
tion. The defendant may rationally opt to wait rather than offer a settle-
ment immediately. If so, the plaintiff must initiate the litigation to have
any hope of a positive outcome, lest the game is one of waiting in which
case the plaintiff always loses. This situation creates a potential for
brinksmanship. Settlement depends on the credibility of the plaintiffs
willingness to engage in risky behavior. If he does not engage in litiga-
tion, there may be no return. If he engages in litigation, the best possible
outcomes are a settlement of 100 at the end of Stage 1 (a net positive 30
return after deducting cost) or litigation through Stage 2 resulting in a net
loss of -40. 117 Given the spread of these returns, the "investment" in an
NEV case must be considered highly speculative. In this light, the de-
fendant would have little incentive to pay 100, a princely sum in light of
the poor prospects of the plaintiff's return, precisely because the credibil-
ity of the threat is marginal. Accordingly, the most likely prediction is
that the plaintiff would not initiate the lawsuit or the defendant would
settle for a small nuisance value. This is a far simpler explanation that in
fact correlates with empirical observation.
4. Implication on Risk Preference
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the real option model of valua-
tion is its implication regarding the nature of risk preferences. Recall
that derivatives have two general purposes in the market-hedging and
speculation. The real option model emphasizes the importance of specu-
lation:
117. Since the litigation cost of 70 spent in Stage I is sunk cost, it is rational to pursue liti-
gation at the cost of 70 to earn a return of 100.
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[It] suggests that "riskier" lawsuits can be more valuable to risk-
neutral plaintiffs than "safer" lawsuits if the plaintiff is able to reduce
or eliminate his litigation expenditures sufficiently in the event the
lawsuit evolves poorly from the plaintiffs perspective .... [R]isk-
neutral defendants in our model can act as though they are risk-
averse, and risk-neutral plaintiffs can act as though they are risk-
seeking .... 118
This conclusion is consistent with an option framework that analo-
gizes the plaintiff to the holder of a call option. Since variance increases
option value, holders like riskier assets whereas issuers prefer the oppo-
site.
This distinction in attitudes towards risk is illusory. That the plain-
tiff is the holder of a call option seems intuitive enough. But the defen-
dant is not only an issuer; he is also a holder of a put option on the under-
lying substantive right. 119 A defendant gains if this right declines in
value. To put it differently, this put option is in-the-money if there is a
finding of no liability, a positive payoff to the defendant, albeit it is not a
cash payoff. In the analysis of legal risk, it is best not to think in terms
of cash payoffs, i.e., whether the defendant must pay the plaintiff. We
start with the fact that each party is subject to a negative outcome from
trial. The negative outcome to the defendant is obvious. For the plain-
tiff, the analogy of a lawsuit to a call option implies that he has nothing
to lose but the option premium (transaction cost). 120 If true, it makes
sense that he would prefer high variance. This proposition is misleading,
however. It assumes that the only cost involved in the resolution of a
dispute is the transaction cost (a cash cost), and arbitrarily starts the time-
frame for the transaction at the time of filing the action. In reality, the
injury to the plaintiff is also a cost, and the transactional timeframe be-
gins upon the occurrence of the alleged wrong. At issue is an ambiguous
right. It is unknown who owns the substantive right: whether the plain-
tiff has a right to compensation or the defendant has a right to harm. As
Coase famously intuited, each party has harmed the other and the law
simply allocates the right to do so. 121 Litigation assigns the cost of this
injury. A plaintiffs loss of a case means that the cost must be internal-
ized, and thus she has far more to lose than simply transaction cost.
If option theory is applied to a lawsuit, the analysis should recog-
nize a put-call option parity in the relationship between plaintiff and de-
118. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1315-16.
119. See supra note 51 (defining put option).
120. Id. at 1288.
121. Coase, supra note 3, at 13.
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fendant. 122 Upon the transaction giving rise to the injury, the defendant
forces the plaintiff to issue a put option where the underlying asset is the
substantive right. Upon filing of a claim, the plaintiff forces the defen-
dant to issue a call option on the same asset. If the put option is in-the-
money (a finding of no liability), the plaintiff loses the value of her in-
jury, which is the defendant's gain. If the call option is in-the-money (a
judgment of liability), the defendant loses the value of the injury, which
is the plaintiffs gain. There is symmetry here. The transaction giving
rise to the dispute resulted in a cost that has been initially assigned to the
plaintiff. The ultimate assignment of this cost remains unclear. The best
possible outcome for any party is the original position of zero cost (the
plaintiff is remedied or the defendant owes nothing). Each party, in ef-
fect then, starts from the premise of the original position with an uncer-
tainty of ultimately having the cost judicially assigned. The parties are
tied together by the underlying transaction and the litigation payoffs are
zero-sum. 123 Viewed this way, it is inaccurate to suggest that the defen-
dant is only an issuer of a call option for there is no benefit that inures to
him (recall that the transaction cost of litigation goes to the attorney).
But the defendant has a potential benefit (winning the case), and the pay-
off of this benefit can be seen through the prism of a put option. Al-
though the parties' payouts are mirror opposites, this put-call parity sug-
gests that the risks are the same. The option analogy fails in the sense
that the payoff of an in-the-money option simply places the parties in
their original position, without profit or loss.
The conclusion that parties have different preferences for "riskier"
and "safer" cases is thus suspect. If lawsuits are indeed real options,
both the plaintiff and the defendant would exhibit risk seeking prefer-
ences as may be the case of option holders. The question is whether this
behavioral prediction comports with observations of the empirical world,
including settlement practices. It does not. Rather, parties behave in a
manner generally consistent with risk aversion, which is assumed in asset
pricing models.
122. This terminology is borrowed from the "put-call parity" principle of options markets.
This principle says that the value of a call and put option on the same stock under the same
terms must be governed by a precise mathematical relationship. See Cox & RUBENSTEIN, su-
pra note 50, at 39-44 (discussing the put-call parity).
123. The payout of a judgment amount is zero sum in that a defendant's loss is precisely
the plaintiff's gain. The allocation of transaction cost is not a zero-sum game and can take the
form of a cooperative game. Moreover, the valuational constructs between the parties may not
be zero sum. For example, the disclosure of information may not have perfectly inverse cor-
relative effect on mutual valuations.
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V. INCOMPLETENESS OF THE STANDARD MODEL ANALYSIS
It is easy to see an analogy between an option and a lawsuit, 124 but
option pricing theory does not apply well to the general framework of le-
gal valuation. A fundamental problem is one of definition. An option is
not a thing that generates its own value; it derives its value from the un-
derlying asset. This is the case even for real options. We must be care-
ful to distinguish option value from asset value. The standard text on
corporate finance makes this distinction: "Notice that real options analy-
sis does not replace DCF [discounted cash flow]. You typically need
DCF to value the underlying asset." 125 An option analogy must recog-
nize that the underlying asset is the dispute over the substantive right.
The real option embedded in a lawsuit is the procedural option to litigate
or settle. It has a value that is distinct from the value of the underlying
right.
The definition of a derivative also explains the behavior and risk
preferences of option holders and issuers. The holder of an option pre-
fers higher variance of the price of the underlying asset, and the issuer
prefers the opposite. This raises the question: is it true that, all else being
equal, plaintiffs prefer higher risk lawsuits? The intuitive answer seems
to be "no." After all, the ubiquitous refrain is that litigation is an en-
deavor that should be avoided if possible, and the rates of settlement and
trial suggest that disputants heed this message. Moreover, the intuitive
answer is consistent with the view that parties are investors in an eco-
nomic venture. Most people dislike risk and they discount the value of
an asset accordingly.
The suggestion is not that option theory is irrelevant. Every merito-
rious lawsuit has a degree of uncertainty. Without it, there would be no
dispute since, by definition, the parties would agree on the outcome.
Litigation reduces uncertainty through information acquisition. This pro-
cedural option must have value, suggesting that the greater the ambiguity
surrounding the disputed right, the greater should be the value of this
procedural right. Thus, the procedural right derives its value from the
underlying asset (the substance of the dispute), which is consistent with
the definition of a derivative.
Seen in this context, a lawsuit is fundamentally an asset that gener-
ates a future, uncertain cashflow. Asset pricing principles must govern
124. Indeed, in an earlier article, I too noted that a lawsuit "shares the essential characteris-
tics of a financial option." See Rhee, Application of Finance Theory, supra note 16, at 137
(citing Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's Fees in Fed-
eral Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943, 1955 (1998)).
125. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 598.
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its valuation. In this regard, the standard model is an incomplete asset
pricing model. 126 Probability simply calculates the expected value, but a
mean value bears no relation to the variance of the data within. Thus,
probability cannot account for a risk adjustment in the discounting proc-
ess. The problem is the assumption of risk neutrality, which creates a
glaring contradiction. If uncertainty is the ruling condition of a lawsuit,
how can risk neutrality be the standard assumption?
As described above, DCF and NPV valuation is a two-step process.
The first step forecasts a future cashflow. This forecast is simply the best
guess as to the future-the expected value. Since this projection is sub-
ject to the vagaries of forecasting in an uncertain world, its sum cannot
equal true economic value. The second step discounts the expected value
by its risk. An expected value bears no relation to the risk therein. It is a
probabilistic calculation; many sets of variables can produce the same
expected value. Under the standard model two cases that are expected to
produce binary outcomes [100, 0] and [51, 49] are valued at the same
expected value of 50. This result ignores the marked differences in vari-
ance. Yet risk cannot be ignored in a valuational model simply by posit-
ing an assumption of risk neutrality. Accounting for risk should be a
fundamental valuational consideration.
A simple corporate finance example is illustrative. Consider three
firms with various businesses that generate income. Firm A has one line
of business, which has an equal probability of generating earnings of 200
or 0. Firm B has two lines of business, each of which has an equal prob-
ability of generating earnings of 100 or 0. Firm C has one line of busi-
ness that is certain to generate earnings of 100. The quantity of future
cashflow of all three firms is the same (expected value of 100), but the
quality of these earnings is not the same. Since the earnings of Firm C
are certain, it has the lowest variance even though it is undiversified.
The highest risk cashflow belongs to Firm A, followed by Firm B. If an
investor was to provide capital, which firm would be charged the highest
cost of capital? It must be Firm A due to its highest risk cashflow. It has
an all-or-nothing prospect that makes its earnings more risky than the
others. Thus, Firm A would have the lowest market value while Firm C
would have the highest even though both firms are expected to produce
126. Most scholars assume that the standard model is an asset pricing model. See Cornell,
supra note 10, at 178 ("[a]ccording to the discounted cash flow model, the value of a lawsuit
equals the expected value of the payment at trial minus the cost of litigation."); Grundfest &
Huang, supra note 9, at 1273 ("[w]hen NPV analysis is applied to litigation, the lawsuit's ex-
pected value is typically described as the probability that the plaintiff will prevail multiplied by
the likely award."); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 568 ("plaintiff s net ex-
pected gain from litigating is the judgment if he wins discounted by his estimate of the prob-
ability that he will win, minus his litigation costs").
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the same cashflow on a probabilistic basis. 127
This intuitive understanding of the impact of probability and risk on
valuation is portable to legal valuation. Consider three cases. Case A is
a tort case for increased risk of a future harm from exposure to a carcino-
gen. If the future injury is proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
the plaintiff recovers 200. If not, there is no liability. The entire case
depends on the credibility of the two conflicting expert witnesses. Case
B is a negligence action as a result of the plaintiff slipping on a banana
peel on the supermarket floor. It is undisputed that the plaintiff broke her
arm, causing a damage of 50, but the parties dispute the permanence of
her disability. Upon a finding of permanent disability, the plaintiff
would be entitled to another 100 in damage. The finding of permanent
disability depends on the credibility of two expert witnesses who have
offered conflicting testimony. Case C is a medical malpractice action in
which the surgeon accidentally left a scalpel in the plaintiffs thoracic
cavity, and the scalpel subsequently moved during ordinary body move-
ment and cut a major vessel in the heart, killing the plaintiff instantly.
The case of liability is clear, and the jurisdiction has consistently
awarded 100 for wrongful death. The expected value of these three cases
is 100, or thereabouts, but obviously the qualitative assessment of risk is
different. Case A is highly speculative. Case C is not risky at all as li-
ability and damage are clear. Case B falls in between. Although the
probabilistic calculation of expected value yields approximately the same
outcome, we recognize that risk must affect the value of these cases.
Just as a firm has a cost of capital, the risk of a lawsuit, which is the
variance of return, determines the cost of resolution. Unlike the cash ex-
pense of transaction cost, the cost of resolution is less accessible because
it is incorporated into the valuation. While it is correct that under the
standard model "changes in variance have no effect on a lawsuit's credi-
bility or settlement value," 128 we must distinguish the deficiency of the
standard model from any perceived shortcoming of asset pricing theory.
Under asset pricing principles, risk must affect the value of an asset and
the standard model fails to account for this concept.
Fundamentally, the process of dispute resolution is an exercise in
risk management. In the above corporate finance example, we saw in
rudimentary fashion how risk is reduced through diversification (Firm B
is more diversified than Firm A and thus less risky). It is true that a sin-
gle lawsuit cannot be diversified in the traditional sense if a party does
not hold a portfolio of lawsuits. If there was a primary trading market
127. See supra note 48 (providing a market example of this concept).
128. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1316.
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for legal actions, or a derivative market to trade risk, much of the task of
private dispute resolution would be governed by market pricing, and per-
haps the legal profession of lawyers would share a role with a new pro-
fession of risk management firms. I recognize that these markets do not
exist, and likely cannot exist for most classes of cases. 129 But there is a
larger point beyond the merits of diversification. Each lawsuit has a
level of risk associated with its expected value, and each party can take
risk mitigation measures during the dispute resolution process. In the ab-
sence of market pricing, each lawsuit is a market onto itself, and each
party is forced to be a "market-maker" for the other. As explained in the
next section, the pricing of transactions within this micro-market deter-
mines settlement and litigation values.
VI. ESSENTIAL NATURE OF A LAWSUIT
A. Portfolio Risk and Preference for Settlement
The inherent benefit of reducing variance suggests that the assump-
tion of risk neutrality in bargaining literature is unrealistic and mislead-
ing. Risk neutrality is defined as indifference between a sum certain and
its expected value equivalent. 130 In a Coasian world of zero litigation
cost, this implies that a risk neutral person would be indifferent between
a certain settlement at the expected value and an uncertain trial, at least
under the standard model. With identical views of probability, trials and
settlements would be equally likely. With moderate variations of prob-
ability and risk preferences among parties, trials would still be frequent
because differences in valuations resulting from different probability as-
sessments may be offset by the premiums and discounts associated with
differences in risk preferences. In the real world, however, trial is a
highly infrequent event, and most cases settle. 131 This empirical obser-
129. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 24-29, on file with author) (explaining that
legal disputes are not conducive to objective pricing). But see Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in
Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 334-41 (1987) (describing the benefits
of a market in tort claims).
130. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 31, at 55-56; POSNER, supra note 40, at 11.
131. See Galanter, supra note 43, at 463 tbl.1, 507 tbl.4 (trial rate in federal civil actions
declined from 11.5 to 1.8 percent); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Set-
tlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Fed-
eral Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIR. L. STuD. 705, tbl.7 at 730 (2004) (settlement rate for contested
federal civil cases is approximately 68.7 percent). Indeed, most disputes settle without the in-
tervention of law. See Ross, supra note 113, at 141 (95 percent of automobile insurance
claims are settled); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 4-6 (1991) (most disputes among neighbors are settled).
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vation raises two questions. First, why do parties settle? Second, how do
they settle? The conventional wisdom focuses on the relative cash costs
of settlement and litigation processing. The assumption is that settlement
is far less costly than litigation, thus explaining the empirical observa-
tion. 132 While these considerations are certainly valid, transaction cost
economics, which focuses on processing costs, is an incomplete an-
swer. 
1 3 3
Transaction cost economics predicts that the incentive to settle di-
minishes with continued litigation since spent transaction cost is a sunk
cost under the American rule of attomey fees. 134 Parties should be most
likely to settle early when the economic surplus is the greatest. But em-
pirical observation belies the prediction. Settlements occur at all stages
of litigation, seemingly at random points in time.135 Many cases settle at
a point when virtually all transaction costs have been expended. 136 If
transaction cost considerations account for the tendency to settle, contin-
ued litigation should spiral toward trial. These phenomena and contra-
dictions have puzzled scholars and attorneys alike. 137 There is a percep-
tion of wasteful activity, a forlorn mouming of lost possibilities upon
hindsight, and a frustration with the apparent inefficiency in the legal
system where the attorneys, if not the clients, are repeat players. 138
132. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 1075.
133. When the stake at dispute is small relative to the transaction cost involved, then trans-
action cost saving is the predominant factor. Many small cases are settled primarily with
transaction cost in mind. See ROSS, supra note 113, at 141. However, when cost becomes
relatively smaller, it is not a predominant factor, but simply one of many factors that go into
the decision of settlement or trial. See id. at 163 ("This study and others have found that pro-
portionally more large cases than small cases do in fact go to trial, consistent with the hypothe-
sis that trial reflects manifest disagreement in negotiation."); Posner, supra note 1, at 419 n.29
("There is empirical evidence that higher stakes do increase the likelihood of litigation.").
134. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 34, on file with author).
135. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 574 ("A final question about settlement is, when does
it occur? It can be at any time in the course of a legal dispute, including before suit is filed and
after judgment is rendered by the trial court. Many cases in fact are settled on the eve of
trial.").
136. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?
An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1235, 1273 (2006) ("more settlements will occur later in the litigation process-and
close to the date set for trial-than earlier in the litigation").
137. See O'Connell, supra note 31, at 259, 269 ("Rather, we have a system that results in
prolonged, expensive fights over whether claimants are deserving.... If early offers benefit
both claimants and defendants, why don't parties reach the early offers result in the current
system through pretrial bargaining?").
138. The common explanation for settlement in the face of exhausted costs focuses on the
assumption that probability assessments have converged. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 568.
But this is more of an assumption that conveniently explains away the empirical observation.
See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 34, on file with author); see also Lowenstein & Moore,
supra note 110, at 37 (suggesting that the disclosure of information leads to divergence of
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This problem is more apparent than real. It is the inevitable product
of a limited definition of cost. If transaction cost is the only cost of reso-
lution, settlement would be far cheaper, thus the "axiom that a bad
settlement is almost always better than a good trial." 139 But the conven-
tional wisdom underestimates the true cost of resolution. The cost of set-
tlement is small only if it is seen as a cash expense of processing. While
this is the common understanding, it is an incorrect view. Settlement
cannot be a cost-free endeavor because it is a risky transaction. This risk
is not recognized in a cash expense, but is imbedded in the valuation. It
is difficult to grasp or measure. But the acceptance of an unsupported
valuation early in the litigation to save transaction costs may prove the
enduring adage "penny wise, pound foolish." The process of settlement
can result in a deal that is substantially below the "fair" value of a law-
suit. The proverbial fear among parties of leaving money on the table, a
known empirical observation, suggests that litigants implicitly consider
the true cost of resolution. 140 Settlement can be a process where one cost
is simply swapped for another without apparent advantage. Thus
viewed, transaction cost economics is an incomplete answer to the ques-
tion of settlement.
The primary reason parties settle is to terminate the uncertainty of
trial. 14 1 Simple in concept, this statement requires some unpacking. We
start with the basic premise of risk. Here, Markowitz's seminal work on
Portfolio Theory provides a good analytical tool. Any given portfolio of
investments has an expected return and risk. Risk is measured as disper-
sion about the expected return. 14 2 Markowitz rejected the once-standard
rule of investment that "the investor does (or should) maximize dis-
counted expected, or anticipated, returns." 14 3 This rule of expected value
is inferior because it implies that variance is irrelevant. 144 He observed
views on probability as each party interprets ambiguous evidence egocentrically).
139. In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F.Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
140. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 43 (1999) (positing that parties make bargaining decisions to
minimize the emotion of post-transaction regret). The fear of regret is based on sound finan-
cial economic principles.
141. In the context of insurance disputes, Ross suggests the primary reason why parties
prefer settlement: "The claimant can eliminate the chance of no award and the defendant can
eliminate the possibility of a 'runaway' jury verdict by a compromise that violates the letter of
the formal law but accords with the spirit of negotiation." ROSS, supra note 113, at 141.
142. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 89.
143. Id. at 77.
144. Id. This rule prescribes that if an investor believes Enron, for example, is a good in-
vestment, he should buy as many shares as possible. Apparently, Ken Lay, former chief ex-
ecutive officer of Enron, had most of his wealth in Enron stock, and at one point it reached an
approximate value of $400 million. KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE
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that diversification reduces variance such that a diversified portfolio with
an expected return is superior to an undiversified one with the same ex-
pected return. 145 Rather, the better rule is that "the investor does (or
should) consider expected return a desirable thing and variance of return
an undesirable thing."'146 Consequently, the prescription is that an inves-
tor should maximize return at the lowest risk.
Portfolio Theory explains the preference for settlement. There is a
parallel between the rule of investment that Markowitz rejected and the
standard model of legal bargaining. The standard model implies indif-
ference between a sum certain and its expected value equivalent in a
costless world. Since litigation is not "free," transaction cost constitutes
the primary basis for the policy favoring settlement, as well as the em-
pirical observation that most cases settle. But Portfolio Theory suggests
that an investor should not be risk neutral when there is an opportunity to
eliminate it without conceding expected value. If the prevailing valua-
tional construct assumes that most people are risk averse, an investor
should seek the expected value at the lowest variance. One should only
be indifferent between a risk-adjusted sum and its expected value equiva-
lent. Without this adjustment one should prefer the certain return over its
probabilistically equivalent return for the simple reason that the investor
is not being paid to bear risk. All things being equal (a significant condi-
tion), settlement is preferred because it reduces the variability of out-
come. Thus, the elimination of variance is the key inducement to bar-
gaining.
B. Risk Hedging in Settlement
If risk fundamentally defines a lawsuit from an economic perspec-
tive, dispute resolution is an exercise in portfolio risk management. Un-
der this framework, differences in perceived variance, even with the same
view ofprobability and expected value, produce different valuations. We
start with the simple case where the parties agree on probability and
variance. In a Coasian world of zero cost, the expected payoffs are equal
probability, binary outcomes of [100, 0]. The parties are exposed to the
variance of outcome since trial is an all-or-nothing proposition. If they
STORY 370, 418 (2005). Despite urgings from his family members to diversify, he did not do
so, saying "Why sell a stock when you feel strongly it's going to continue on up?" Id. at 370.
145. The concept that diversification reduces risk is not new, but is found in interesting
places. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 1 ("My ventures
are not in one bottom trusted, nor to one place; nor is my whole estate upon the fortune of this
present year; Therefore, my merchandise makes me not sad.").
146. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 77.
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wish to eliminate this risk, the expected value of 50 must be realized
through settlement at the midpoint. This is clear enough. But the trans-
actional mechanics achieving this Solomonic result are more nuanced.
Each party hedges the risk of variable outcome by implicitly executing
mutual gaming (or derivative) transactions. 147 If the judgment is 100,
the plaintiff would pay the defendant 50; but if the judgment is 0, the de-
fendant would pay the plaintiff 50. Each party bets 50, and thus the bet-
ting odds are even at 1:1. When these bets are in place, the risk is per-
fectly hedged and the trial outcome is irrelevant. 148 The risk-reward
profile is efficient in the sense that the expected return is maximized at
the lowest risk. 149 It is true that each party could achieve a better result
ex post by risking trial, but this point is irrelevant because risk manage-
ment is an ex ante exercise. Settlement must be the preferred outcome
even in a costless world. Table 1 illustrates the hedging transaction.
Table 1: Hedging Transaction
Outcome Bet Net Cash
Scenario 1
Plaintiff +100 -50 +50
Defendant -100 +50 -50
Scenario 2
Plaintiff 0 +50 +50
Defendant 0 -50 -50
In the parlance of finance, each party hedges its position by issuing
a put option against its most favorable outcome. When there is mutual-
ity of hedges, the returns are locked in and there is settlement. Since a
gaming analogy is more intuitive than an analogy to financial derivative
transactions, the remainder of this section applies a gaming perspective.
147. A derivative transaction is very much like a gaming wager in which each party makes
a bet on the movement and volatility of the underlying asset or index. See supra Part III.B.
148. Gould conducted a similar analysis: "a 'probabilistic' settlement is made wherein A
agrees to reduce his claim against B in the event that A wins in court in exchange for an
agreement that B will pay A something if A loses in court." Gould, supra note 1, at 290.
Gould analyzed the case of differing probabilities and expected value. Id. at 296 ("If differ-
ences in probability estimates exist, then individuals will go to court and make what is in effect
a 'side bet' on the outcome."). The analysis, here, maintains probability and expected value as
a constant and varies the perceived risk.
149. From the defendant's perspective, the return is maximized when the cash outflow is
minimized.
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Here, settlement is possible because a common wager fixes the profit or
loss for both parties. Even in a zero transaction cost world, there is no
incentive to litigate. No party can "profit" any further, and consequently
there is no incentive to "trade" in the underlying legal dispute. This re-
sult is independent of transaction cost considerations. Thus, a simple
definition of settlement is the following: In the special case where the
parties agree on the expected value and variance of outcomes, a rational
settlement is achieved when returns are fixed and variance is eliminated
through a mutual series of implied hedging transactions.
The inclusion of transaction cost does not change this analysis, ex-
cept that a common return to both parties is impossible. For example, if
transaction cost is 10 for each party, the expected value of the lawsuit is
still 50, but a matching bet of 50 results in plaintiff's cash inflow of 40
and defendant's outflow of 60. But the important point is preserved: the
expected value is fixed for each party. The parties would still settle at 50
since variance is eliminated, except that we recognize an important bene-
fit of extracting economic surplus from saved transaction cost. For the
moment, the following examples exclude transaction costs, but they are
not forgotten for long.
If there is no mutual hedging strategy, litigation can continue even
in a costless world. This conclusion apparently differs from the predic-
tion of the Coase Theorem, which states that in a costless world the ini-
tial assignment of legal rights is "without effect" since parties will
achieve a private ordering that efficiently allocates economic re-
sources. 150 The theorem assumes that "the results of legal actions [are]
easy to forecast." 151 Yet, if the outcome is highly uncertain, as would be
the case at the start of most lawsuits, parties are incentivized to resolve
this ambiguity for there would be a wealth effect of that judicial assign-
ment of right. The key assumption of the Coase Theorem is that eco-
nomic assets are allocated efficiently under "conditions of perfect com-
petition" where "the price system is assumed to work smoothly (that is,
costless)."' 152 The real market, Coase reasoned, is one of transactional
friction, and cost must be a substantial consideration. Implicit in Coase's
conception of transaction cost is the recognition that sound risk-reward
analysis disfavors speculation. As a result, cost expenditure is needed to
determine the price of the transaction.
150. Coase, supra note 3, at 10; see Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Alloca-
tion and Liability Rules - A Comment, 11 J. L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1968) ("If one assumes ra-
tionality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocation of
resources will be fully cured in the market by bargains.").
151. Coase, supra note 3, at 19.
152. Id. at 6.
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In most cases, probability, variance and risk preference are different
between parties. If an independent gaming market exists, each party can
construct their own portfolios of risk and the cost would simply be the
fee charged by the bookmaker or the risk management firm. 153 Since an
independent gaming market does not exist, the parties must replicate the
transactions internally. Thus, we must ask: what conditions dictate these
implicit wagers? A key concept in answering this question is confidence.
Confidence determines the level of investment, which is considered an
informed bet on a future outcome. In his landmark work The General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, John Maynard Keynes
noted the role of confidence in investment:
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great
weight to matters which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, there-
fore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which
we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively
relevant to the issue than other facts about which our knowledge is
vague and scanty. For this reason the facts of the existing situation
enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the formation of our long-
term expectations; our usual practice being to take the existing situa-
tion and to project it into the future, modified only to the extent that
we have more or less definite reasons for expecting a change.
The state of long-term expectation, upon which our decisions are
based, does not solely depend, therefore, on the most probable fore-
cast we can make. It also depends on the confidence with which we
make this forecast--on how highly we rate the likelihood of our best
forecast turning out quite wrong. If we expect large changes but are
very uncertain as to what precise form these changes will take, then
our confidence will be weak.
The state of confidence, as they term it, is a matter to which practical
men always pay the closest and most anxious attention. But econo-
mists have not analyzed it carefully and have been content, as a
rule[,] to discuss it in general terms. 154
Keynes's idea addressed capital investments in the macroeconomic
context, but it easily applies to the microeconomic context of legal bar-
153. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 32-33, on file with author).
154. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 148-49 (Harbinger 1965) (1935).
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gaining. Where the goal is investment vis-d-vis speculation, 155 an unin-
formed bet is an irrational one. Confidence is one arbiter of rationality.
When uncertainty is perceived to be low, parties rationally place greater
bets because they are more confident. But when variance is high, as is
typical in beginning of a legal action, it would be foolish to wager with-
out the receipt of offsetting odds for the risk taken. High risk cases are
problematic because the amount of wager necessary is high, but the eco-
nomics dictate lower wagers. When both parties face the same uncer-
tainty, it would be tempting to view the mutuality requirement as offset-
ting risks, i.e., speculative bets by the parties on opposite propositions
could be seen as offsetting. However, there would be a paradox in that
the rationality of one's act would depend on the irrationality of the
other's. If mutual speculation is rational, it would be equally rational to
decide the case on the basis of a coin flip. Rational investment means an
informed decision. 156
The matter is also complicated if two parties do not hold the same
view of risk. In a philosophical sense, the uncertainty in a case is per-
haps one objective state (only an experiment of repeated trials would
confirm this), but, absent omniscience, the important consideration is the
perception of uncertainty, which varies with the subjective views of the
parties. In the early stages of litigation then, settlement is more difficult
because the amount of the betting required to fix a rate of return would
be higher than what the parties may be willing to underwrite even con-
sidering the anticipated transaction cost.
Consider a simple case where the parties share the same view of
probability and expected value, but differ on variance. The plaintiff
views the case as high variance with expected outcomes [100, 0], and the
defendant views it as slightly lower variance [75, 25]. The expected
value under both perceptions is 50, but the plaintiff believes there is a
good chance of losing the case while the defendant believes liability is a
foregone conclusion and the case will turn on the extent of damages.
The two cases may represent the temporal (or procedural) evolution of a
case from filing, when little may be known about the case, to a later pro-
cedural stage, when some of the variance has been reduced through the
155. Markowitz distinguished investment from speculation in that investment entails be-
havior that maximizes return at the lowest risk whereas speculation entails the assumption of
risk without appropriate return. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 87-89.
156. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Information Acquisition and the Resolution of Conflict,
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 259 (Kenneth Arrow et. al, editors, 1995) ("It is com-
mon to say that conflicts can be resolved more easily under full information, when all parties
concerned understand the consequences of the alternative possible policies or other deci-
sions.").
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process of discovery and court rulings. 15 7 For now, assume they are the
same case at the same point in time, except that the parties hold different
views of risk. Under both the standard model and the Grundfest-Huang
real option model, the settlement value would be the expected value of
50.158 If the proposition that variance must affect valuation is to have
meaning, the valuations must be different.
The analysis starts with the betting amount. Since the parties differ
on risk, there is no longer one bet that fixes the returns for both parties.
We note the outcome most favorable to the plaintiff, either 100 in the
plaintiffs view or 75 in the defendant's view, as Scenario 1, and the out-
come favorable to the defendant, either 0 or 25, as Scenario 2. To fix the
expected value at 50, the plaintiff must bet 50 but the defendant can only
bet 25. For the defendant, a bet of 50 results in net cash of -25 for Sce-
nario 1 and -75 for Scenario 2, the same net result if no bet was placed.
Table 2 illustrates the problem of mutuality.
Table 2: Problem of Mutuality
High Variance Low Variance
Plaintiff's Perception Defendant's Perception
Outcome Bet Net Cash Outcome Bet Net Cash
Scenario I
Plaintiff +100 -50 +50 +75 -50 +25
Defendant -100 +50 -50 -75 +50 -25
Scenario 2
Plaintiff 0 +50 +50 +25 +50 +75
Defendant 0 -50 -50 -25 -50 -75
Mutuality at the plaintiffs required bet of 50 is impossible because
the defendant receives no benefit in the reduction of risk (i.e., the returns
are the same post-bet). Any bet outside of 25 would be pointless for the
defendant. For example, if he bets 30, the returns are [-45, -55], the
same returns if the bet was 20. Thus he has no incentive to bet outside of
the range 0-25. The defendant's position is the constraint. Mutuality at
157. At the start of a case, notice pleading practice only requires that the complaint be a
"short and plain statement" of the claim and defense, and the ethical obligation requires only
"an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)-(b), 11 (b).
158. For the purpose of the real option model, we would need to know the level of transac-
tion cost. If we assume transaction cost of 20 divisible into two stages, the settlement value
would be 50 for both scenarios.
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the defendant's maximum bet of 25 fixes his return, but produces a vari-
able return for the plaintiff of [75, 25]. If the parties select trial with
these bets in place, the defendant's position is perfectly hedged at the ex-
pected value of-50 and he has no risk. 159 But the plaintiff's position is
variable and she bears the cost of variance. Table 3 shows the outcomes
when the bets are placed under the defendant's constraints.
Table 3: Bets Under the Defendant's Constraint
High Variance Low Variance
Plaintiff s Perception Defendant's Perception
Outcome Bet Net Cash Outcome Bet Net Cash
Scenario 1
Plaintiff +100 -25 +75 +75 -25 +50
Defendant -100 +25 -75 -75 +25 -50
Scenario 2
Plaintiff 0 +25 +25 +25 +25 +50
Defendant 0 -25 -25 -25 -25 -50
This risk analysis simply states the obvious starting point-the
plaintiffs position is riskier. If risk is a bad thing, she has two options.
She can eliminate the risk by selling it to the defendant, who will only
buy it for a price (i.e., concession in expected value), or by reducing it
through continued litigation.
Consider first the choice of settlement through a concession in
valuation. We start with the rule that risk and reward are tradeoffs. Un-
der Portfolio Theory, there is an efficient horizon of risk and reward,
suggesting that one cannot increase return without assuming greater
risk. 160 Reducing risk is not per se a superior proposition; rather assum-
ing unnecessary risk is an inferior proposition. The prescription is to re-
duce risk to the lowest level to achieve the expected return. Like arbi-
trage in the financial market, these rules play an important role in
regulating price in legal disputes.
When one party perceives higher risk, a common wager amount that
fixes the returns for both parties is impossible. Although the expected
value is the same, the risk is different. The party perceiving the higher
159. The expected value of -50 cannot be considered a risk. It is simply a forecast of the
projected cash outflow. The risk is the deviation from this expectation.
160. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 180-92 (discussing Markowitz's efficient
portfolio horizon).
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risk must offer a discount, in the form of a concession to the expected
value, to reduce the greater risk. The maximum discount is the expected
value equivalent of the difference between the maximum wager amounts
of both parties: 0 < 5 < WH - WL where W is the wager of the parties per-
ceiving the high and low variance and 6 is the discount. In the above
case, the maximum discount is 25 (= 50 - 25). Thus the discount range
is 0-25, which can be translated into a betting spread in the range of 1:1 <
6 < 1:3. As a matter of terminology, this betting spread is called the
hedge ratio. The hedge ratio determines the risk-reward tradeoff. The
hedge ratio selected within the discount range is a function of each
party's risk preferences.
Assuming that the parties share similar risk preferences and agree
on the expected value and variance, we see that the hedge ratio is always
1:1. Absent strategic behavior or imperfection in information dissemina-
tion or acquisition, these conditions should always yield settlement. In
the above case, the maximum hedge ratio of 1:3 means that the plaintiff
implicitly bets 75 in exchange for the defendant's bet of 25. The bet at
1:3 fixes the plaintiffs return at 25. The defendant's position is now
variable at [0, -50], but the expected value of -25 is better than the -50
he was expecting with a bet of 25 at the 1: 1 hedge ratio. The defendant
assumes greater risk (a variable return) for greater return (a reduction in
expected value). Given these bets and the resulting reallocation of the
portfolio risk, the expected value has changed from ±50 to ±25. Table 4
shows the transaction at a 1:3 hedge ratio.
Table 4: Transaction at 1:3 Hedge Ratio
High Variance Low Variance
Plaintiff s Perception Defendant's Perception
Outcome Bet Net Cash Outcome Bet Net Cash
Scenario 1
Plaintiff +100 -75 +25 +75 -75 0
Defendant -100 +75 -25 -75 +75 0
Scenario 2
Plaintiff 0 +25 +25 +25 +25 +50
Defendant 0 -25 -25 -25 -25 -50
Differences in perceived variance affect settlement valuation even
when the parties agree on the expected value. In practice, settlement
cannot be valued only in terms of expected value. In most cases, ex-
pected value does not equal true economic value. Thus viewed, we mod-
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ify the definition of settlement: In the case where parties agree on a
common expected value but differ on variance of outcomes, a settlement
is achieved when variance (risk) and expected value (reward) are ex-
changed through a mutual series of implied hedging transactions such
that one party reduces variance and the other increases expected value.
This article does not dispute that expected value is the most impor-
tant determinant of value in the sense that it sets the general range of set-
tlement values, i.e., the proverbial "are the parties playing in the same
ballpark."' 16 1 If parties cannot agree on the broad valuation parameters,
there is little hope of private resolution. Once this general range is ac-
cepted, expected value loses much of its relevance: once the ballpark is
identified, the game still remains to be played. Here, the perceptions of
risk play a critical role in valuation. Higher risk results in greater dis-
count to value. If a low risk case is valued at x, the party perceiving the
higher risk case concedes a risk-adjusted discount 6: if the plaintiff (x -
6), and if the defendant (x + 6). Uncertainty is the fundamental driver of
valuation and settlement behavior. The assumption of risk neutrality is
not only irrelevant but also nonsensical in the context of bargaining. To
ignore risk through an assumption of risk neutrality is essentially to ig-
nore the most difficult part of the analysis.
Relative risk preference and perception are important factors. The
proportions in which expected value and variance are exchanged in this
implied bargain depend on the individual risk preference and cost of
variance. Consider the situations of single-play individuals and repeat-
play corporations. Repeat players such as insurers can take a less risk
averse (perhaps even a risk-neutral) position on the variance of individ-
ual cases since a portfolio of assets and liabilities can reduce variance. 162
Moreover, shareholders in a corporation can diversify away the risk of an
investment in the corporation by holding a diversified portfolio. Single-
play parties, typically individuals, are subject to the variance of an indi-
vidual case and cannot diversify their risks by holding a portfolio. The
only method of hedging the risk of variance of outcome is to engage in
the implied series of gaming/derivative transactions described above.
The same case, with operative facts and laws viewed similarly, can still
present different risks, e.g., the risk of a portfolio versus an undiversified
single event, or the differences in the impact of an adverse outcome.
These differences may create a cost of variance differential. Thus, there
is a potential for two different valuations though the parties may share
161. See ROSS, supra note 113, at 146 ("The expected value in litigation is thus the most
important factor influencing the general level of settlement for a serious bodily injury claim.").
162. See id. at 214 ("[T]he insurance company as a whole in defending large numbers of
claims is unaffected by uncertainty with respect to any one claim").
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similar views of expected value.
Empirical observations confirm the application of risk-adjusted dis-
counts in settlement practice. In his classic study of settlement behavior
of insurance companies, Laurence Ross analyzed the way insurers and
insureds treated risk and revealed this insight into real world practice.
The claimant contemplating settlement or litigation is faced with a
calculus of probabilities. Settlement offers a known award with cer-
tainty whereas litigation offers an unknown award with an unknown
probability, although both the award and probability may be esti-
mated by the experienced attorney. In other words, litigation involves
not only additional processing costs from the claimant's viewpoint; it
also involves a gamble that may be totally lost. By taking many such
gambles in litigating large numbers of cases, the insurance company
is able to regard the choice between the certainty and the gamble with
indifference. In the words of another analyst:
Generally speaking there will often be asymmetry be-
tween the parties, insofar as the suit is a regular, calcula-
ble element in business operations for one of them, and a
unique event for the other. It means that the former will
be... much less deterred by the likelihood of losing indi-
vidual cases, providing he can transfer the loss to a group
of customers or clients.
The insurance negotiator therefore expects the claimant to yield a
discount for the certain payment:
We should always try to fix the fair settlement value from
the standpoint of what a judge or jury would award. This
does not mean that the defendant should pay in settlement
the full sum that he feels would constitute the jury's ver-
dict. He should force proper reductions from that sum by
taking advantage of the considerations that the outcome of
a lawsuit is always uncertain and that the defendant has
some opportunities of emerging victorious.
Moreover, this expectation is shared by the claimant's side of the bar:
I have always recommended to the injured person that a
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settlement of 75 to 80 per cent of the probable recovery
should be accepted. 163
It is important not to attribute Ross's observations to just differences
in risk preference between single-play policyholders and repeat-play in-
surers. For an insurer, a lawsuit is "a regular, calculable element in busi-
ness operations" whereas for an individual it is "a unique event for the
other." 164 Also, relative to one's wealth, the litigation stake is far greater
for most individuals than it is for most corporations, suggesting that the
cost of a negative outcome will have greater impact on the former group.
Thus, different perceptions and impact of risk and effects of variance of
outcome result in different valuations.1 6 5
C. Litigation Option
In the above example, we reasoned that the plaintiff may need to of-
fer as much as a 1:3 hedge ratio, suggesting a settlement value of 25
when the expected value is 50. This may represent too much of a dis-
count because litigation may present an opportunity to reduce the uncer-
tainty associated with this discount at a marginal rate. Consider then the
choice of litigation. Litigation is the product of the tension that always
exists between settlement and speculation: the elimination of variance is
good, but speculative betting is bad. Each party must reconcile this ten-
sion. When a settlement leans more towards speculation, the compro-
mise is continued litigation, which reduces variance and avoids or delays
a speculative bet. In the above case, the plaintiff may forego settlement
if she considers the discount too high. This seems like an odd result in
light of the standard model, which prescribes that if the defendant values
a case higher than the plaintiff, there is a positive contract zone from
which the parties can and should strike a deal. The reason for this incon-
gruity is risk. Because risk imposes a higher cost of resolution, which
reduces valuation, litigation may yield better pricing. No one can expect
continued litigation to increase a party's probability of prevailing qua
expected value. The expected value may increase, decrease or remain
static; the assessment of a case follows a random walk that is largely un-
predictable. 166 But it is rational to expect that continued litigation re-
163. Id. at 214-15 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 214.
165. "Ordinarily, the parties prefer negotiation partly because of its certain recovery, and
the claimant usually prefers the certain recovery even more than the insurance company, thus
yielding a discount from the expected value in litigation." Id. at 218.
166. The knowledge that there is yet undisclosed information has no relevance to probabil-
ity since probability is formed upon a rational connection among known facts. See Rhee, su-
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
duces uncertainty. Each party has a procedural option to litigate rather
than to settle under unfavorable conditions. Since this real option is a
right, it must have value.
Variance increases option value of the procedural right because
there is more benefit to litigation. 16 7 This can be seen in a simple exam-
ple. Consider a tort action in which it is unknown whether the defendant
breached the standard of care. There is a set of facts {f, .. . f2o} that bear
on this issue. Each piece of information favors one party or the other
with equal impact (noted as x), and they are disclosed smoothly through-
out litigation along with a commensurate expenditure of transaction cost
{TJ ... T20 }. 168 At the start of a case, assume that equal probability is a
reasonable approximation. 16 9 Iffi is disclosed and it is favorable to the
plaintiff, the parties must assess the plaintiffs probability of success as
P, = 0.5 + x. This is the best assessment available at this point. The dis-
closure of f1 increases probability, but the confidence in these assess-
ments must be low given that most facts {f2 . . . f20} have not been dis-
closed.
Confidence is intimately linked to the perception of risk. In any
given case, the risk of a lawsuit can be categorized into general and
unique risk. General risk is the risk associated with the inherent uncer-
tainty of human decisionmaking given a set of facts and laws from which
plausible reasoning can produce multivariate outcomes. Unique risk is
the risk specific to the case such as the applicable laws and unique set of
facts and circumstances that define the case. 170 General risk can never
be eliminated absent a bribe, undue influence or other illegality. 17 1 Dis-
pra note 4 (manuscript at 30, on file with author). In other words, if X represents the impact of
undisclosed information, then P = X P.
167. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 9, at 1276 ("[T]he larger the variance, the more
dramatic and potentially valuable the information waiting to be disclosed during the course of
the lawsuit .. "). If the future is a certainty, there would be no value in the procedural right to
pursue trial. Settlement would occur at the price of the certain outcome.
168. I make a distinction between information and noise. Noise is "the arbitrary element
in expectations," the diverse array of unrelated elements that causes price to deviate from in-
trinsic value. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529-30 (1986). Information is the element
that is relevant to discern intrinsic value. Id.
169. The statistical Principle of Indifference provides that "two events are equally prob-
able if we have no reason to suppose that one of them will happen rather than the other."
BULMER, supra note 33, at 8. This is not an absolute rule in legal bargaining. Obviously, each
party possesses information, and there is significant information asymmetry. But in many
cases parties may be reduced to an assumption of equal probability without the benefit of for-
mal discovery.
170. This concept is borrowed from Markowitz's Portfolio Theory. See BREALEY ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 162 & nn.26-27, 181-82 (discussing the concept of market risk and unique
risk in Portfolio Theory).
171. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 43-44, on file with author). The law implicitly
makes distinctions between risk unique to a specific transaction or act, and general risk that is
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closure and information mitigates the unique risk of a case, and thus we
can say that confidence is a function of the unique risk. The expected
value is the best estimation of the trial outcome J', but a party must also
expect deviation from this assessment. The more risky a proposition, the
less confidence one has in it. With this in mind, the further in procedural
distance the assessment of expected value is from the trial outcome J',
the less confident one would be. In other words, a party should be less
confident in his belief of trial outcome at the filing of an action than on
the eve of trial. 172 Each fact or ruling moves expected value closer to J',
and the limit of perfect disclosure is general risk. If the sequential dis-
closure of favorable and unfavorable information is evenly distributed
and random, and if the case is litigated a number of times in a controlled
experiment, the relative frequency should be close to 0.5, though we
would expect individual cases to deviate significantly from the mean as a
result of normal distribution. Like stock prices, individual case assess-
ment moves in a random walk through the litigation process. 173 This
motion, or volatility, determines the value of the procedural option.
As probability moves with the legal process, the cumulative impact
of the disclosures is subject to a diminishing marginal utility effect. 174
Assuming equal weight of information, we expect that each subsequent
disclosure would have less impact on the assessment. For example, the
first packet of informationfi would have a greater influence on probabil-
ity than the last packet f2o. If litigation is broken into two stages of trans-
ubiquitous. For example, this division of general and unique risk is implicit in the scheme for
judicial review of arbitration awards. Any error pertaining to matters of unique risk, whether
errors of law, procedure, evidence or factfinding, are generally not subject to reversal. Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (Federal Arbitration Act does not provide for "judicial
review for error"), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). But judicial review is available for errors related to cor-
ruption, fraud, undue means, and misconduct. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also First Options
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (judicial review available for "manifest dis-
regard of law"). Likewise, one can make an argument that the doctrine of proximate cause is
driven by a conceptual difference between ubiquitous risk that cannot be mitigated and unique
risk created by a defendant's negligent act. Compare Brauer v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 103
A. 166 (N.J. 1918) (defendant who negligently caused a collision is responsible for the petty
theft of goods dispersed as a result of the accident), with Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R.R.,
126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910) (defendant who negligently caused a derailment is not responsible
for the destruction of property as a result of an arsonist igniting gasoline that had leaked due to
an accident). The different results from these cases are discussed in terms of foreseeability,
but another way to consider cases involving proximate cause is whether a defendant's action
increased a peculiar risk to a plaintiff or whether the relationship between factual causation
and risk is simply coincidental.
172. This is the same in the financial markets where, say, a speculator would have greater
confidence in predicting tomorrow's stock price than in the one year forward price.
173. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 35-39, on file with author).
174. See id. at 47-49.
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action costs: Stage 1 = {f1T 1... f10Tl0} and Stage 2 = {f11T11 ... f2oT20}
with smooth distribution of information, we see that, in our simplified
world, litigation in the beginning stage has greater effect of reducing un-
certainty. 175
Figure 1: Marginal Utility of Information
0 I
oI
0 Valuation Delta
I- I1
' |Stage Stage 2
The litigation option is bought for a premium, which is the transac-
tion cost. Unlike the premium in a financial option, transaction cost is
not fixed, but incurred on a pay-per-use basis. It is the cost of accessing
the pricing mechanism; it advances discovery, case theory development,
and procurement of legal ruling, which collectively impact probability,
reduce perception of variance, and influence settlement. Expending cost
to acquire information can be a good thing, but the benefits are subject to
diminishing marginal utility. 176 This is consistent with option theory,
which says that the passage of time diminishes option value. 177 In litiga-
tion, procedural progress and time are approximate equivalents since a
lawsuit unfolds in a sequential manner. At some point in the sequence,
the cost-benefit analysis may, and often does, reach an equilibrium with
transaction cost saving.
175. This assumes that each quantum of new information has equal weight. In a contested
action that is not subject to pretrial disposition, evidence may vary as to impact, but sudden
and radical shifts in case assessments are uncommon and evidence tends to be more incre-
mental. Thus, the assumption is not too far of a stretch.
176. "Information is valuable; it is also costly, both in resources and in time. Value in im-
proving decisions must be balanced against cost." Arrow, supra note 156, at 269.
177. See Cornell, supra note 10, at 183 ("Uncertainty is also a function of time.... With
respect to litigation, the longer the interval between the time a suit is filed and the time a deci-
sion is reached, the greater the probability that events will occur that affect the final award.").
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The option value changes with perceived variance. We continue the
previous example of the high [100, 0] and low [75, 25] variance views.
If the defendant values the low case at Vd = 50,178 the plaintiff must
value the high case at Vp = 50 - & With equitable bargaining, the parties
should settle at (50 - 6/2). But if settlement is struck at this amount, the
discount 8/2 represents "value leakage" in settlement and may require
speculative betting. The plaintiff must then consider the alternative to
settlement.
The trial option, noted as 7t, can be seen as the opportunity cost of
foregoing litigation. Because the plaintiff perceives variance to be
greater, we expect that it1 > 7td, and the option delta 7t' = Rtp - 7id. Given
the same view of expected value, the relative valuation is expressed in
the equation: 50 + td = 50 - 6 + itp, which reduces to t' = 6. The option
value is bounded by the discounted amount. Thus, the expected value
can be restated as the procedural option value plus the underlying asset
value.
The option delta 7t' measures the discount that separates the parties'
valuations at any given time. It may be difficult for the defendant to
"buy" the option delta t' to settle because the value of continued litiga-
tion for him is only Itd. Payment for t' would offer no additional return
to the defendant, which is to say that he should require a discount if the
plaintiff holds a higher risk case. If the option is bounded by the dis-
count amount and if the parties hold the same expected value with differ-
ent views of variance, the parties would disagree on the relative valua-
tions. In the above example, each party in isolation would value their
case at 50. In a relative valuation, however, the defendant would dis-
count the plaintiff's value by 6/2 whereas the plaintiff would value her
case at 50 since 6 and 7t' are approximately offsetting. Concessions in
bargaining then focus on the option delta (or risk discount). Even with a
shared view of expected value, the valuations are typically pulled apart
by different perceptions of variance as measured by the option delta (see
above Figure 1). This is particularly so in the beginning of a case when
uncertainty is the greatest and the incentive for concessions is the least
due to the aversion to speculation. 179
178. Since the defendant perceives variance, his value must be more than 50. In other
words, since he is in a position of acquiring a liability, he would be indifferent to a sum certain
(50 + 8) to a variable outcome of [75, 25]. Note that in this posture, if the plaintiff is certain of
the outcome [50, 50], the discount under the above method would be 12.5 and the parties
would settle at 62.5, the mirror opposite of the result achieved in the above example. Keeping
the defendant's value at 50 without a discount, however, produces no error because the hedging
analysis reduces the defendant's position of [75, 25] to a sum certain equivalent [50, 50] by
concomitantly reducing the plaintiffs variance from [100, 0] to [75, 25].
179. If litigation would eliminate all risk of trial outcome, we would expect a convergence
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It is helpful to see how these concepts work in the context of trans-
action costs and the progress of litigation. We continue the example of
the high [100, 0] and low [75, 25] variance cases. We divide the proce-
dural context into pre-litigation and litigation. If settlement is achieved
pre-litigation, assume the transaction cost is 0. If litigation proceeds,
transaction cost is 10, twenty percent of the expected value, split into two
equal Stages 1 and 2. If settlement is achieved at the end of Stage 1,
each party incurs a cost of 5. For simplicity, we assume that probability
and expected value do not change with continued litigation, though the
ability of the parties to predict this ex ante is virtually impossible. For
the purpose of modeling, only variance is reduced for both parties. As-
sume that the defendant's variance is reduced from [75, 25] to [60, 40] at
the end of Stage 1. Because the plaintiffs case is riskier from the begin-
ning, assume two possibilities of a future state: a moderate risk reduction
[75, 25] and a high risk reduction [60, 40].
1. Pre-Litigation Stage
Based on the above conditions and as previously analyzed, the dis-
count range is 0-25, implying a settlement range of 25-50. With equita-
ble bargaining, the settlement value is 37.5. Since no transaction cost
has been spent so far, this is the net value. As suggested above, however,
this settlement may be too costly for the plaintiff given the opportunity
cost of foregoing litigation. She may select litigation. Given the above
assumptions, the choice of litigation may produce a future state of "mod-
erate" or "high" risk reduction. Consider each separately.
2. Stage 1 Litigation (Moderate Risk Reduction)
At this stage, the plaintiff and defendant hold views of [75, 25] and
[60, 40]. The plaintiff must bet 25 to eliminate risk, but the defendant
can only bet 10. The hedge ratio is 2:5. This implies a maximum dis-
count of 15, and so the valuation range is 35-50. With equitable bar-
gaining, the settlement value is 42.5. Net of transaction cost, the plaintiff
receives 37.5 and the defendant pays 47.5. The plaintiff is no better or
worse off for litigating up to Stage 1, whereas the defendant is made
worse off with litigation.
of true economic value to the gross expected value. This would be true under the discounting
formula. In a riskless world where there is no time value of money, the "raw" expected value
equals true economic value. For example, a value of 100 expected two years in the future
equals a true value of 100 since 100 = 100 - (1 + 0%)2.
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3. Stage 1 Litigation (High Risk Reduction)
Under this scenario, both parties view the outcomes as [60, 40].
Because they agree on probability, expected value, and variance, there is
no longer a premium. Both parties would bet 10. With equitable bar-
gaining, the settlement value is 50. Net of transaction cost, the plaintiff's
return is 45 and defendant's is 55. This is a dramatic turn of events. By
opting for litigation, the plaintiff has increased the value of her asset on a
relative basis, while the defendant suffered losses in value. The table be-
low summarizes these case scenarios.
Table 5: Comparison of Case Scenarios
Expected Hedged Premium Equitable Net Re-
Outcomes Bet Outcomes Midpoint Settlement turn
Pre-Litigation Stage
Plaintiff [100, 0] 25 [75, 25] 12.5 +37.5 +37.5
Defendant [75, 25] 25 [50, 50] 12.5 -37.5 -37.5
Stage 1: Moderate Risk Reduction
Plaintiff [75, 25] 10 [65, 35] 7.5 +42.5 +37.5
Defendant [60,40] 10 [50, 50] 7.5 -42.5 -47.5
Stage 1: High Risk Reduction
Plaintiff [60,40] 10 [50, 50] 0 +50 +45
Defendant [60,40] 10 [50, 50] 0 -50 -55
The above examples show the connection between the theory of as-
set pricing and empirical observation. In theory, if parties agree in some
general range of probability and expected value, they should settle as
early as possible because of the overarching concern over litigation cost.
In practice, however, contested cases settle later than earlier. 180 If ex-
pected value and probability are kept constant, the convergence of vari-
ance leads to a diminishment of the discount. The result is a closing of
the valuation gap towards a more similar return. When parties differ on
variance, the valuations are pulled apart by the option value. The parties
must negotiate these differences, including the amount of the discount
(concession to expected value). In the above example, each party has
opportunities to achieve a settlement that is better than their own valua-
tion. The plaintiff achieves superior valuation at the end of Stage 1
180. See supra notes 135 & 136 and accompanying text.
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(High Risk Reduction) scenario net of transaction cost while doing no
worse than the Pre-Litigation Stage at the end of Stage 1 (Moderate Risk
Reduction) scenario. On the other hand, the defendant achieves better
results than his valuation of 50 in the Pre-Litigation Stage and Stage 1
(Moderate Risk Reduction) scenario. When we account for the true im-
pact of risk on valuation, the effect of the cost of resolution-a cost that
is imbedded in the valuation-is apparent.
The above examples also show how valuation is intertwined with
game theory. With the clarity of hindsight, the defendant could have
fared better by demanding less discount as a part of the negotiation strat-
egy. The problem of uncertainty, however, must always be viewed from
an ex ante perspective: what is the best choice now given the known in-
formation and the uncertainty of the future? In the negotiation process,
the defendant should have acquired information not only on the plain-
tiff's view of expected value, but also variance as reflected in the confi-
dence level of assessment. In pre-litigation, the range of rational bargain
was 25-50 with an equitable price point of 37.5. In hindsight, any set-
tlement between 37.5 and 47.5 would have yielded better results for the
defendant. Perhaps an offer of 40 would have made settlement less
costly for the plaintiff, inducing the selection of settlement with an ac-
ceptable cost of resolution. The ability to assess these decisions, how-
ever, is only possible upon proper acquisition of information, not only
about the facts and laws applicable to the case but also about the other
party's assessments of probability and variance, a critical analysis needed
for a relative valuation of the lawsuit. Such decisions are matters of ne-
gotiation tactics and strategy, issues beyond the scope of this article, but
the point is that valuation and bargaining strategy are inextricably inter-
twined.
D. Restatement of Price Theory
At this point, a summary of the argument is helpful. A lawsuit must
be valued under an asset pricing model. Expected value calculation un-
der the standard model does not adjust for risk. In practical terms, the
risk-adjusted discount depends on the degree of variance from the trial
outcome (as measured by the degree of confidence). The primary benefit
of settlement is the elimination of variance. In a dispute, a rational party
actively manages and hedges risk. Consistent with financial economic
principles, the parties implicitly barter for a reduction in variance by
agreeing to mutually reduce risk when their views on risk are similar or
by swapping expected return for reduction in risk when their views are
sufficiently different. In the beginning, a settlement is difficult. There is
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a Catch-22 situation in that the goal is risk mitigation but each party may
be required to engage in speculation to do so. In the beginning, the risk-
adjusted discount is significant. Parties would be averse to betting
speculatively without an appropriate return. At any stage in the dispute,
each party has a procedural option to litigate, and the premium is the
transaction cost. This option value augments the lawsuit value and off-
sets, in whole or in part, the discount to expected value of the option
holder. The greater the uncertainty in litigation, the greater is the option
value. But the option value decays along a diminishing marginal utility
curve. This decay coincides with a diminishment of the discount to the
expected value as variance is reduced. All the while, the assessment of a
case is a function of unknown information to be disclosed in the future,
and it moves in a random walk as the future impact of undisclosed in-
formation is most difficult to predict. The resolution of settlement and
litigation is a complex affair in which each party calculates the risk and
reward of expected value, option value, transaction cost, and discount.
These factors tug and pull on valuation, and the optimal solution is elu-
sive given the lack of market pricing and the subjective nature of the in-
quiry. This suggests that settlement can take place at any time, and the
timing of settlements can appear to be random as valuations converge
and diverge at various points in the random walk of litigation.
In an earlier article, I proposed a Price Theory of legal valuation
that explains how these valuational components come together to deter-
mine the cost of resolution. 181 The important innovation of that article is
the concept of a selection horizon, which is the indifference point be-
tween trial and settlement. 182 The intuition is that there is a price point
at which each party would be indifferent between the two, and these se-
lection horizons are unique to each party. The location and shape of the
selection horizon depend on each party's risk preference and cost of
variance, and they are then mapped against the variables of probability
and variance. Valuation, then, is not conducted in isolation, but is rela-
tive. Assessment must be considered relative to one's selection horizon,
which determines the magnitude of the premium or discount, and this as-
sessment is then compared to the other party's assessment. The effects
of probability and risk preferences on value are obvious. By assuming
risk neutrality, the standard model eliminates the need to analyze the ef-
fect of risk, the governing condition of a legal dispute, The goal of this
article is to show the conceptual framework of how risk affects pricing.
181. See Rhee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 54-57, on file with author).
182. See id.
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Figure 2: Selection Horizon and Discounting
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Figure 2 shows how these ideas come together. A case is assessed
as to probability and variance, and the assessment occupies a point in the
matrix, in the above points A, B and C. The selection horizons are
marked by H and H'. The location of the selection horizon, as deter-
mined by the x-intercept, indicates the degree of risk preference: if it
moves to the right, trial is less preferred than settlement, indicating a
stronger degree of risk aversion, and vice versa. In addition to the loca-
tion of the selection horizon, we also consider its slope. The slope is a
measure of the cost of variance, the degree to which this case impacts
each party. The amount of the stake at issue is a factor. Also, a repeat
player is less sensitive to the outcome of a particular case than a single-
play party. 183 We can say that the repeat player has a lower cost of vari-
ance because diversification reduces the variance of outcomes. The in-
tuition is, then, that the selection horizon slopes positively: as variance
rises to complete uncertainty of outcome, parties would settle rather than
submit to a seemingly random, arbitrary system of justice. As variance
and probability approaches zero, trial and settlement are synonymous
since the outcome cannot be disputed. 184 The important point here is
183. Single-play parties can also be insensitive to variance of outcome in any given case.
For example, wealthy individuals, relative to the stake, may be insensitive to the variance of
outcome.
184. Most persons would come to a private agreement. This conclusion applies only to
contested, meritorious actions. If the justice system is wholly arbitrary, it is an invitation for
frivolous actions. See Gould, supra note 1, at 296 ("If the courts acted arbitrarily and without
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that the perception of risk is not only understood from a case specific
viewpoint, but also from a broader viewpoint of one's portfolio for a re-
peat player and wealth (or capital holding). As a general matter, we can
say that repeat players and institutional parties have higher sloping selec-
tion horizons than single-play or less wealthy parties, though even repeat
players who are commonly perceived as risk neutral, such as insurance
companies, have a cost of capital that is charged against its operating li-
abilities.
In view of these principles, consider the action between A and B.
Both parties hold the same probability assessment (thus expected value),
but differ on variance. Assume that they have different selection hori-
zons: A's is H and B's is H'. Based on the shortest distance to the selec-
tion horizon H', B requires a premium of (b + b') because B prefers trial
based on the assessment relative to H'. On the other hand, A offers a
discount of a because the assessment lies to the left of the selection hori-
zon H. These premiums and discounts can be noted as beta 3. Different
views on variance and probability and the location of the selection hori-
zon account for the differences in beta. For example, assume B and C
hold the same selection horizon H and view of variance but C holds a
more favorable view of probability than B: based on the different as-
sessments relative to the common selection horizon H, the premium c is
far greater than b.
The concept of a selection horizon captures the interplay of risk
preferences, cost of variance, probability, and variance. Beta incorpo-
rates the risk adjustment for variance as discussed in the previous section
and the risk preferences. The value of a lawsuit, then, is represented as:
V = (P x J) + 7t + 3 ± T. The cost of resolution in any given case is a
multivariable calculation. The option value depends on the perceived
variance. Consistent with option pricing principles, only the option value
it increases with increased variance. Beta decreases litigation value with
increased variance, consistent with asset pricing principles.
An asset pricing model correlates better with the experience of the
empirical world. It implies that parties dislike the risk of a trial outcome
and, all else being equal (a significant condition), prefer the zero vari-
ance achieved through settlement. This simple principle explains in
large part why so many cases in fact settle. It also explains in large part
why so many cases in fact settle after substantial litigation and sunk
transaction cost. Litigation can be an economically productive and ra-
precedent, an enormous number of property right disputes would have to be resolved in court,
and this would be a costly and serious impediment to the efficient organization of economic
activity.").
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tional endeavor, a point that is not emphasized enough in the current en-
vironment of almost visceral hostility to lawsuits. Given the complex
connections among probability, variance, confidence, weight of evi-
dence, and risk preferences, the process of dispute resolution cannot be
reduced to linear deterministic analysis that calls for the reduction of liti-
gation "waste" and more "efficient" dispute resolution. If the persuasive
force of such an argument was so strong, we expect that the legal market,
as vast as it is, would have adjusted and early settlements in meritorious
actions would be rather routine affairs given that attorneys are always re-
peat players. But settlements occur at all phases of litigation, with ap-
parent randomness, which suggests that factors other than transaction
cost savings are at work. Indeed, in pricing a legal dispute, the parties
may find that it is not in their best interests to settle early just to create
economic surplus from transaction costs.
If an asset pricing model is reasonably accurate as a positive model,
the following is an inevitable prediction: all else being equal, early set-
tlements are typically struck when a party's cost of resolution exceeds the
opponent's opportunity cost such that they are priced at unfavorable lev-
els relative to the expected value.185 Data on the impact of continued
litigation on settlement value does not exist, and my prediction may be
difficult to prove empirically. However, there is some support. The tort
and insurance areas may provide examples in which a plaintiffs cost of
resolution is high enough to exceed the defendant's opportunity cost, re-
sulting in early, low value settlements. Ross observed in Settled Out of
Court that attorney-represented cases are consistently settled at higher
values than unrepresented ones, 186 but that representation "increases de-
lay very impressively."' 187 These observations indirectly suggest that late
settlements are valued higher than early ones. There are significant ca-
veats to this conclusion: selectivity in case selection skews data, 188 and
attorneys are better negotiators than insureds. 189 Empirical inference is
difficult for precisely the same reason individual valuation cannot be re-
185. In theory, increased transaction costs should not increase settlement value since under
the American rule each party bears their own fees and costs. In practice, it is uncertain
whether attorney fees are systematically incorporated into valuation, contrary to the rule of
law, to increase the overall settlement values or to incentivize attorneys to recommend settle-
ment. My guess is that it would not, but a study would be interesting.
186. Ross, supra note 113, at 116. "Representation was found to be the most important
single factor accounting for payment, apart from liability and damages." Id. at 193.
187. Id. at 228.
188. Id. at 167. Nevertheless, Ross observed that "on the whole, similar claims receive far
higher payments when represented than when handled by the claimant directly." Id.
189. Id. at 168 ("1 believe that a good part of the discrepancy between the amounts re-
ceived by represented and unrepresented claimants stems from the deficiency of the latter in
negotiation skills.").
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duced to a quantitative science. Market data is lacking; comparative
valuation is a slippery concept in application; and public information
found in case law may reflect skewed data. These caveats ultimately un-
dermine any inference from Ross's observations of the cause and effect
of litigation on value. An empirical study, to be reliable, must be careful
in sorting out the obvious selection bias, i.e., early settlements may be
struck because the cases are less meritorious or more routine. Perhaps
these difficulties are insurmountable, but if we can establish as an em-
pirical observation that later settlements are valued higher than early set-
tlements as predicted by asset pricing theory, this would change the en-
tire discussion of the "inefficiency" of litigation.
E. Attorneys and Asset Pricing
An analysis of attorney behavior and influences supports the propo-
sition that lawsuits are assets. Attorneys are generally agents of their cli-
ents. 190 In contingent fee arrangements, however, plaintiff attorneys are
not merely agents, but are business partners of their clients. They pro-
vide the intellectual and financial capital to the venture. 19 1 Many plain-
tiff attorneys are co-invested in the financial project and are influenced
by economic self-interest. 192 The decision to undertake a case depends
on "sound investment decision." 193 In the other context of defense attor-
neys who work on hourly fee arrangements, the financial incentives are
not as closely linked. 194 The fee arrangement may incentivize inefficient
work. No doubt that this agency cost is incurred in practice, but the legal
market for attorney services is also competitive. The discipline of mar-
ket forces-those who are willing to work cheaper and more effec-
tively-should weed out much of the inefficiencies. 195 All in all, al-
190. See George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility,
67 FORDHAM L. REv. 273 (1998) (discussing agency cost).
191. Rhee, Application of Finance Theory, supra note 16, at 157 ("[T]he attorney provides
not only the intellectual capital and labor but often the financial capital in the form of contin-
gent attorney's fees and costs.").
192. See Charles A. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the
Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 295-96 (1984). See also
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "'Public Law " Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 890 (1984) ("The primary goal of plaintiff attorneys is
to maximize not the expected judgment, but rather their own expected return - their fees.").
193. Rhee, Application of Finance Theory, supra note 16, at 157. See Earl Johnson, Jr.,
Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 567 (1980-81) (analyzing the economic determinants of attorney behavior).
194. In these arrangements, overbilling creates significant ethical issues. See Herbert M.
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature
Really Say?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1943, 1967 n.132 (2002).
195. This is a general observation, and I assume that switching costs are not so high that
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though some agency cost is inevitable, attorneys do their jobs profes-
sionally and their financial incentives are either directly or indirectly
linked to the success of their clients over the long-term.
Shared or compatible financial incentives between attorney and cli-
ent do not mean they necessarily share the same outlook on litigation
risk. Unlike a single-play client, an attorney holds a diversified portfolio
of cases with various risks. They are not only less risk averse, their cost
of variance is lower in the sense that the loss of one case does not have a
greater impact. Nevertheless, the attorney cannot prosecute every case to
trial. Even if attorneys have substantial control or influence on whether a
case is tried or settled, they are constrained by limited resources and
capital, including not only financial resources but also reputational capi-
tal at risk.196 Most cases are viewed as settlement prospects. In this real-
ity, attorneys, like their clients, implicitly conduct their business in ac-
cordance with the prescriptions of Portfolio Theory: they structure
efficient portfolios. Analyzing each case like an investment in a stock,
attorneys shun "risky" cases in favor of "safer" cases unless the return is
commensurate. 197 No attorney values risk as an inherent good as would
be the case if a lawsuit was truly a financial option. Quite the opposite,
risk is regarded as bad for one's business as well as the client's interest.
Risk and reward are tradeoffs.
The role of attorneys is not only relevant to an analysis of agency
and transaction costs, but also relevant to an understanding of the essen-
tial nature of a legal claim. Attorney services have valuational implica-
tions. Ronald Gilson established a link between principles of asset pric-
ing and the value of attorney services. 198 He challenged the common
perception that "lawyers are seen at best as a transaction cost, part of a
system of wealth redistribution from clients to lawyers; legal fees repre-
sent a tax on business transactions to provide an income maintenance
program for lawyers."'199 The provision of attorney services is an NPV
(net present value) project: the initial investment (attorney fees) must be
weighed against the risk-adjusted returns (benefit of legal advice), lest
attorneys add no social value. 200 Gilson observed that each transaction
they create a systemic inefficiency in the market for legal services.
196. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Cooperation and Competition in Litiga-
tion: Can Lawyers Dampen Conflict?, BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 156,
at 194-95 (suggesting the existence of a "reputation market" for lawyers).
197. This is confirmed by the prominence of progressive contingent fee arrangements,
where various fee triggers are linked to procedural contingencies. Typically, a favorable reso-
lution by trial commands the highest percentage fee.
198. Gilson, supra note 2.
199. Id. at 241-42.
200. "If what a business lawyer does has value, a transaction must be worth more, net of
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requires "correctly priced" assets, and the key role of attorneys is to find
the most efficient price. In the legal market, however, the assumption of
market pricing and efficiency (the prerequisites of efficient capital asset
pricing) cannot be made because lawsuits are generally not subject to
market pricing.20 1 Under these limiting conditions, the task is to achieve
"more accurate asset pricing." 202  Attorneys are crucial to the proper
pricing of transactions: "[1]awyers function as transaction cost engineers,
devising efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital as-
set pricing theory's hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-
than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this world. '203 Thus, at-
torneys must add more value to the asset than their fees.
Although Gilson's article analyzed the role of attorneys in transac-
tional work, his analysis has equal force in the litigation context. Litiga-
tors, perhaps more than transactional attorneys, are thought of purely in
terms of cost, but this expense cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather
than a cost, the services of attorneys can be seen as a capital investment
that is expected to yield a return. Attorneys are instrumental in the
proper pricing of disputes. They reduce the uncertainty of a legal claim
and enhance the value of the asset.204 In short, their work gives the trial
option its value.
Aside from asset pricing, attorneys also provide another important
benefit, if only unwittingly. While attorney incentives may sometimes
differ from that of the client, giving rise to the problem of agency cost, it
is also true that the differences in incentive may actually benefit the cli-
ent. In many cases, individual clients may be single-play actors, but at-
torneys are always repeat players. Because attorneys hold a portfolio of
cases, they are generally less risk-averse than the typical individual cli-
ent. Accordingly, they may be incentivized to take less of a discount
than their clients would, and such frictional influences may actually
serve a client's interest in the end.205 On the other hand, the attorneys of
legal fees, as a result of the lawyer's participation." Id. at 243 (emphasis removed).
201. Id. at 253-54.
202. Id. at 255.
203. Id.
204. Empirical evidence suggests that attorneys who frequently deal with each other re-
solve disputes more quickly and are less likely to take the case to trial. See Jason Scott Johns-
ton & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil
Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 39, 40-41 (2002). One explanation is that these attorneys re-
solve the uncertainties in a lawsuit more quickly, and, thus, settlements are more frequent and
come earlier. Moreover, empirical evidence also suggests that in the United States Tax Court,
represented cases achieve better trial results than unrepresented cases. Lederman & Hrung,
supra note 136, at 1239. Interestingly, this study did not find a statistical relationship between
represented cases and settlement value. Id. Cf Ross, supra notes 188 & 189.
205. Again, this is supported by Ross's empirical observation that represented cases yield
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institutional clients may be more risk averse than their clients because
each client represents a repeat business opportunity. The risk is not sim-
ply the loss of one case, but the opportunity to provide services in many
future cases. The asset may not be viewed as the case, but rather the cli-
ent relationship. Attorneys achieve better results than unrepresented cli-
ents not only because they are better tactical negotiators,20 6 but also be-
cause they are better situated to negotiate. By diminishing the potentially
large gap in risk preferences and having influence on the resolution of a
case, attorneys actually reduce the cost of resolution. Thus, the invest-
ment outlook and role of attorneys suggest that a lawsuit is an asset.
CONCLUSION
An interdisciplinary application of financial economics to legal bar-
gaining is compelling. This article is a part of a growing effort to close
the gap between the two disciplines. At the heart of a contested legal ac-
tion is a claim to an ambiguous right. Certainty obviates litigation, un-
certainty begets dispute. The application of the valuation techniques of
financial economics yields new insights into the old problem of legal
bargaining and the selection of settlement or trial. The insights offered
in this article are several. First, the standard model is an incomplete as-
set pricing model. It projects an expected value, but does not account for
the risk of that gross sum. Second, an option pricing model cannot pro-
vide a general framework for the valuation of lawsuits. Only an asset
pricing framework considers both the value of the underlying asset and
the value of the litigation option, which is really a premium for the for-
bearance of a right to litigate. Lastly, the process of settlement entails a
complex series of mutual gaming transactions wherein the parties seek to
hedge unnecessary risk.
Beyond these technical points are some larger implications. The se-
lection of the pricing model implies certain characteristics and prefer-
ences of disputants. Although the plaintiff and the defendant are on op-
posite sides of an economic transaction, they are investors in the same
project and an economic model should assume that they share the same
perspective on the nature of risk. As a prescriptive rule, each party
should maximize return at the lowest variance if we believe that most
people are risk averse in some degree. The empirical observation of the
real world confirms that disputants typically follow this prescription and
greater settlement value because, in large part, attorneys are better negotiators. See Ross, su-
pra note 189. Ross did not elaborate on this point. Presumably, attorneys have better negotia-
tion skills. Better negotiation can also result from enjoying a superior position.
206. See Ross, supra notes 186, 187 & 189.
[Vol. 78
EFFECT OF RISK ON LEGAL VALUATION
prefer an expected return at the lowest risk, thus explaining the observa-
tion that most cases settle.
That said, settlement and trial can be seen as pricing mechanisms to
value financial assets for which there is no market. The criticism of trials
as an inefficient activity is legion, but this criticism is based on a myopic
view of cost. There is no doubt that litigation is costly. But when mak-
ing a claim that a thing is expensive, it must be asked: costly as to what?
Value is a relative concept, and so we ask: what is the true economic cost
of resolution? Litigation and settlement are alternative pricing mecha-
nisms to value a legal dispute under conditions of uncertainty and in the
absence of market pricing. The cost of settlement is less accessible.
What is the price of a bad settlement? Because this cost is not calculable
as a cash expense, it often gets brushed aside as an inconsequential or in-
convenient fact. Some deals are good, others are bad, such is the game
of bargaining, and we leave it at that. But the pricing mechanisms can-
not be viewed in terms of economic "efficiency" when the true economic
cost is not considered. The cost of resolution must include the concept of
a risk-adjusted discount to value. This can only be done through a gen-
eral framework of an asset pricing model.
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